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In recent years, the Department of the Army has responded to the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of
1996 (FARA) by implementing several policies and procedures. The policies are
designed to cope with the challenge to operate with an ever-shrinking Defense budget and
yet provide our warfighters with the weapon systems they need to succeed. One of the
strategies employed by the Army to this end is Modernization Through Spares (MTS).
In a 22 January 1 996 memorandum sent out by then Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), Gilbert F. Decker expressed his wishes
to test the MTS concept on several programs, including the High Mobility Multi-purpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). He illustrated the MTS concept through an example,
"While the old strategy may have gotten us a good price on a vacuum tube, for example it
is time to begin buying semi-conductor chips with dramatic reductions in life-cycle costs
and dramatic improvements in performance and reliability."
This research will analyze how the Program Manager (PM) of Light Tactical
Vehicles (LTV) of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) implements Modernization
Through Spares (MTS) for their HMMWV program. The objective is to establish the
extent to which PM-LTV implements MTS and identify the methods used for MTS
implementation in order to comply with the Army's strategy for MTS.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
This research will analyze how the program office of Light Tactical Vehicles
(LTV) of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) implements Modernization Through
Spares (MTS) for their High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
program. The objective is to establish the extent to which PM-LTV implements MTS
and identify the methods used for MTS implementation in order to comply with the
Army's strategy for MTS (as indicated in then acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research Development and Acquisition, the Honorable Kenneth J. Oscar's 12 Jan 98
memorandum).
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: How does the PM-LTV implement MTS to
comply with the Army's strategy for MTS? Secondary research questions include:
Does the method used by PM-LTV to implement MTS differ from the Army's
implementation strategy?
What are the objectives, advantages, and disadvantages of MTS?
Do any methods employed by PM-LTV reduce or eliminate the advantages of
MTS?
What challenges does PM-LTV face in implementing MTS?
C. BACKGROUND
In recent years, the Department of the Army has responded to the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of
1996 (FARA) by implementing several policies and procedures. The policies are
designed to cope with the challenge to operate with an ever-shrinking Defense budget
and yet provide our warfighters with the weapon systems they need to succeed. One of
the strategies employed by the Army to this end is Modernization Through Spares
(MTS).
In a 22 January 1996 memorandum sent out by then Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), Gilbert F. Decker expressed his wishes
to test the MTS concept on several programs, including the HMMWV. He illustrated the
MTS concept through an example, "While the old strategy may have gotten us a good
price on a vacuum tube, for example it is time to begin buying semi-conductor chips with
dramatic reductions in life-cycle costs and dramatic improvements in performance and
reliability." [Ref. 1]
A later memorandum dated 18 June 1997 sent out by then Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Army Kenneth J. Oscar, reflected some of the initial progress the Army
had accomplished on MTS. The memorandum reported the success achieved during an
Army conference on MTS (May 28-29, 1997) which revealed the potential is staggering
to:
Reduce long-term sustainability costs (O&S), which consume at least 60
percent of a system's life cycle costs
Upgrade system capability
Introduce new technology which significantly improves reliability
Integrate the military and commercial industrial bases
Mr. Oscar also used the memorandum to direct the establishment of an Overarching
Integrated Process Team (OIPT) to "advise, assist and monitor implementation of MTS
across the Army." [Ref. 2]
Figure 1 represents the key events preceding the development of the Army
Strategy for Modernization Through Spares. A series of Department of the Army
memorandums emphasized the importance and potential benefits associated with MTS.
An MTS workshop in May 1997 laid the foundation for MTS and kept momentum
moving forward for the eventual implementation. Finally, the MTS OIPT published the
Army Strategy for the Implementation ofMTS in early 1998.
22 Jan 96 - ASA (RDA) and AMC Memorandum w HMMWV Identified as Test Program for
MTSw
28-29 May 97 - MTS Workshop held in
Huntsville, Alabama
Workshop a success, MTS concept defined.




12 Jan 98 - ASA (RDA) and AMC Memorandum fc- Implementation of Army Strategy for MTSw
Feb 98 - MTS OIPT Publishes MTS
Implementation Guide
Figure 1 . Key Events for Army MTS [From Data Compiled by Author]
The Army spends billions of dollars annually on spare parts. However, the
majority of these spare parts are simply replacements for existing parts without changing
the design or reliability of the part. [Ref. 1] MTS modernizes existing systems through
replacing spare parts with superior spares, during routine sparing and maintenance
actions.
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
The research will begin with a review of the literature to determine the definition,
objectives, advantages, and disadvantages of MTS. Next, an examination of the
implementation of MTS at the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) will be conducted
to form the basis of how MTS should be implemented within the Light Tactical Vehicle
(LTV) program office. The acquisition strategy developed by the LTV program office
for their High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) in support of MTS
will then be reviewed to discern how the LTV program office supports MTS to comply
with the ASA (RDA) and AMC Memorandum 22 January 1996 memorandum.
Conclusions will be drawn from the analysis and will be followed by recommendations
and suggested areas for further research.
II. MODERNIZATION THROUGH SPARES
A. DEFINITION OF MODERNIZATION THROUGH SPARES
The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD
(ATL)), Dr. J.S. Gansler, defines Department of Defense Total Ownership Costs (DoD
TOC) as, "...the sum of all financial resources necessary to organize, equip, train,
sustain, and operate military forces ...." and "...is comprised of costs to research,
develop, acquire, own, operate, and dispose of weapon and support systems...." [Ref. 3]
Life Cycle Costs (LCC) are a subset of DoD TOC and include acquisition program direct
costs plus the indirect costs attributable to the acquisition program such as depot
maintenance, contractor support, and mission personnel, among others. [Ref. 4]
Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) defines MTS as
...a spares acquisition strategy applied throughout the materiel acquisition
lifecycle to reduce sustainment costs. It is based on technology insertion
and use of commercial products, processes, and practices to extend a
system's useful life. [Ref. 5]
Similarly, the MTS Overarching Integrated Process Team (OIPT) defines MTS as "a
spares/component improvement strategy applied throughout the Acquisition Life Cycle
and is based on technology insertion to enhance systems and extend useful life while
reducing costs." [Ref. 6] The primary focus, then, of MTS is to improve the particular
component while reducing the total life cycle cost of the system. Instead of the old
practice of purchasing the same part or component that was originally designed for the
component, subsystem, or system, emphasis now is placed on using the latest
technological advances when replacing the component to renew the Army's equipment.
The concept of MTS is to modernize existing systems achieved through routine
sparing and maintenance actions. In order to accomplish the modernization, the
replacement spare must replicate the Form, Fit, and Function (F3 ) of the replaced part.
Additionally, technical procedures currently used in the field are not to be altered.
Lastly, the modernized part or subsystem cannot alter or otherwise affect any
Configuration Item (CI). [Ref. 7]
Spare parts management is important because it costs money to maintain
inventory and ultimately affects readiness. The money tied up maintaining huge
stockpiles of spare parts could be used for other pressing priorities. However, the
solution isn't to simply get rid of those stockpiles of inventory, but to better manage the
resources we have to achieve the desired level of readiness and reduce the total cost of
operating the system (the life cycle costs).
Modernization through spares affects the life cycle cost of systems by improving
the reliability of the component. Subsequently, the reliability of the component reduces
life cycle costs by reducing the frequency of maintenance for the system and requiring
fewer inventories to be managed. Generally speaking, as the reliability of a system
increases, the frequency of corrective maintenance required on the system decreases.
[Ref. 8] This makes sense intuitively because as the component reliability improves, the
component does not fail as often and therefore does not need to be repaired as often.
Since the component fails less often, you need new replacement parts less often, which
means you do not need to maintain the same level of spare parts.
Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 70-3 includes MTS as a type of
modification. A modification is "...the alteration, conversion, or modernization of an
end item that changes or improves the original purpose or operational capacity in relation
to effectiveness, efficiency, reliability or safety of that item." [Ref. 27] Other
modification efforts include Service Life Extension Program (SLEP), Pre-Planned
Product Improvement (P3I), and block upgrades. The method to accept the modification
on configuration items already in the Army inventory is the Modification Work Order
(MWO). [Ref. 27] It is useful to define the above terms to differentiate which
modification initiatives can also be classified as a modernization effort.
The Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) defines SLEP as
"modification(s) to fielded systems undertaken to extend the life of the system beyond
what was previously planned." [Ref. 26] This modification may or may not include a
modernization initiative. Perhaps the same operational characteristics are maintained
using "then technology" and only the service-life years are extended.
The DSMC and DA Pam 70-3 provide nearly identical definitions of P3I (the
DSMC version is provided with DA Pam 70-3 deviations in brackets). A P3I "is a
planned future [evolutionary] improvement of developmental systems for which design
considerations are effected [accomplished] during development to enhance future
application of projected technology. Includes improvements planned for ongoing systems
that go beyond the current performance envelope to achieve a needed operational
capability." This clearly represents a modernization effort.
A block modification (upgrade) is "...a grouping of modifications for the purpose
of achieving economies in funds, manpower, equipment and/or time to enhance
configuration management. A block modification includes several modifications in
engineering, procurement and/or application that are managed as a single modification."
[Ref. 27] This modification method could be classified as a modernization effort if that
grouping of modifications inserted current technologies that enhanced the performance or
operational effectiveness of the system or component.
Given the above definitions, the terms MTS, SLEP, block modifications, and P3I
are all modifications. However, MTS and P3I are modernization efforts whereas SLEP
and block modifications may or may not be classified as modernization initiatives. The
MWO is the formal method to process modifications to configuration items once those
items are in the Army inventory.
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MTS
Several advantages and disadvantages prevail through the utilization of an MTS
process. Advantages include improved reliability, maintainability, and supportability;
reduction of life cycle costs; infusion of current technology; and supporting DoD and US
Army goals, initiatives, and directives. Disadvantages include possible
compatibility/interoperability problems; increased supply chain management resource
use; data collection; high up-front costs; and MTS competing with projects with
immediate or near-term payoffs. The following sections describe the advantages and
disadvantages of MTS in greater detail.
1. Advantages ofMTS
One benefit of MTS is that the entire fleet does not need to be retrofitted at once.
As components approach or reach their designed failure point, the component can be
replaced with the modernized part during routine or expected maintenance intervals. Of
course, the upgraded component can also be installed as part of any corrective
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maintenance action as well. The components currently installed on the system or
subsystems are fully exploited until they reach failure or scheduled replacement,
achieving maximum utilization of existing parts. [Ref. 7]
Another benefit of MTS realized from implementation through natural attrition is
that training time is not disrupted due to mass fleet upgrades. Systems are available as
long as they are operational and components only upgraded when the component fails or
is ordinarily scheduled for replacement.
The MTS Overarching Integrated Process Team identified many benefits of MTS
as shown in Table 1. Most of the benefits relate to the relationship between the
contractor and Government (e.g., share risk, share savings, award cost avoidance). A few
benefits stem from reducing overall lifecycle costs or leveraging the availability of funds
while the remaining benefits are attributed to improving the system's performance,
reliability, or maintainability.
Benefits ofMTS
Leverage Spares Procurement Modernization through Overhaul
Reduce Cost of Ownership Change for Commercial Technology
Attrition vs. Forced Retrofit Share Risk
Incentivize Industry Enhance Performance
Team with Industry Reduce O&S Costs
Increase Technology Insertion Prolong Life
Award Cost Avoidance Share Savings
Enhance Availability Performance Based Procurement
Replace Obsolete Parts
Table 1 . Benefits of Modernization Through Spares [After Ref. 6]
Modernization through spares supports the intent of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA (ALT)), formerly the ASA
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(Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASA (RDA)). He established Operating and
Support (O&S) cost reduction as an acquisition priority by issuing a memorandum on 29
April 1997. [Ref. 9] Later, he directed the acquisition community to implement further
guidance on Total Ownership Cost Reduction (TOCR) contained in a follow-on
memorandum. [Ref. 10] In a memorandum dated 18 June 1997, the former ASA (RDA)
highlighted the potential benefits of MTS to
• Reduce long-term sustainability costs (O&S), which consume at least 60
percent of a system's life cycle costs
• Upgrade system capability
• Introduce new technology which significantly improves reliability
• Integrate the military and commercial industrial bases
[Ref. 2]
Several examples exist of organizations reaping the benefits of MTS. Although
successful application of MTS is prevalent in the Defense sector, the commercial industry
has also realized benefits from focused spare parts management.
In 1991, ITT Industries Aerospace/Communications Division located in Fort
Wayne, Indiana formed a team to deal with several problems the company was
experiencing with their customers. They had a low on-time delivery performance (50 to
60 percent) for spares and repairs, no system for tracking or prioritizing spares orders,
and numerous complaints from their customers. The newly formed team was essentially
an integrated process team with members from the Logistics, Manufacturing, and
Contracts departments. They were able to address the concerns of the company; achieve
an increase in their on-time delivery performance to 99 percent; and reduce their bids and
proposals costs by 25 percent. Their improved performance resulted in increased
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customer satisfaction and an increase in the company's sales revenue in Spares, Repairs,
and Support from $4 million to nearly $25 million. [Ref. 1 1]
The U.S. Army Communications - Electronics Command (CECOM) has
benefited extensively through the use of MTS. They have used Commercial off the Shelf
(COTS) components and the MTS approach to enhance the reliability of the Frequency
Multiplier Oscillator (FMO). The program has achieved an increase in reliability of 20
percent and enjoyed benefits such as reduced complexity (reduces procurement and
repair activity), reduced repair costs, and increased availability. Estimated net savings
for remaining life cycle costs are approximately $2.2 million. [Ref. 12]
Another program managed by CECOM successfully implementing MTS is the
User Readout (URO) for the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS).
Their weapon system IPT together with standardization specialists used performance
specifications to reduce a detailed 76-page specification down to a 12-page F
performance specification. They were able to achieve cost reductions for production of
$4,000 per unit (it costs less than $1,000 to build now) and are now able to build it for
less than the previous contract to replace obsolete parts! [Ref. 12]
The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) is also using MTS for
a component of their Patriot Missile System. The Solid State Data Storage (SSDS) for
Patriot missiles is replacing the old Optical Drive Unit (ODU) used to upload mission
critical software for the operation of the weapon system. The upgrade will be
accomplished through an attrition-based strategy utilizing readily available commercial
parts. Reliability of the SSDS is much greater than the ODU and is expected to exceed
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the life of the system. Over the five-year period beginning in 1999, O&S cost savings are
estimated to be $81 million. [Ref. 13]
2. Disadvantages ofMTS
Though there are many advantages achieved from MTS, it is imperative to
consider the disadvantages as well. Because MTS uses replacement through attrition, it
is possible for two different part numbers to be in existence for the same part in the
supply system causing confusion among maintenance and supply personnel. Component
replacement problems may arise from the confusion causing delays and increasing the
administrative delay time. Interoperability and compatibility issues may arise due to
more than one version of the repair part being available at a given time. [Ref. 7]
Data collected on the modernized component or system may be difficult or
impossible to determine or obtain. Since modernization occurs through attrition, the
configuration of the fleet will be a mix of old and new components, which adds a burden
to the logisticians responsible for supporting the system. Even a robust information
tracking system would find it difficult to compile failure data on the modernized part or
subsystem with mixed configurations present. [Ref. 7]
When program managers and field commanders are faced with selecting a project
that would reduce operating and support costs (over the long-run) or a project that
improves safety, availability, or readiness (in the near-term), the project offering near-
term benefits often wins. In an August 2000 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on
Defense Acquisitions, it was reported that most operating and support cost reduction
efforts require a heavy up-front investment that may take years to pay back. 'This slow
pay-back, and the many uncertainties that accompany improvement projects, make it
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difficult for the initiatives to compete against investments that provide near-term
improvements in safety, availability, or combat capability." [Ref. 14]
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF MTS BY THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
The Honorable Kenneth J. Oscar, as acting ASA (RD&A), formed an
Overarching Integrated Process Team (OIPT) for MTS on June 18, 1997 to formalize the
MTS process, provide assistance, and monitor implementation. [Ref. 2] In a subsequent
memorandum published January 12, 1998, the acting ASA (RD&A), together with the
commander of US Army Materiel Command, General Johnnie E. Wilson, formalized the
implementation of the Army strategy for MTS. [Ref. 15]
In accordance with the acting ASA (RD&A) guidance, the MTS OIPT published
a guide, "Army Strategy for Modernization Through Spares" to assist all Army managers
who develop systems or buy spares. [Ref. 6] The guide suggests the MTS approach can
be applied to any weapon system in any life cycle phase but made a distinction between
the outputs of a program in one of the Pre-Milestone III phases and a program in the
Post-Milestone III phase. The MTS process is essentially the same; only the focus and
outputs are different. A program in one of the Pre-Milestone III phases implementing the
MTS process should focus on how modernization will be achieved throughout the
system's life cycle. In other words, the focus should be on "designing for
modernization." [Ref. 16] For programs in the Production, Fielding/Deployment, and
Operational Support Phase (Post-Milestone III), emphasis is on the use of performance
specifications to enhance the design baseline. [Ref. 6]
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The OIPT identified five key elements of the MTS approach: The Integrated
Process Team (IPT); Related Efforts; Inputs; Key Functions; and Outputs. Figure 2
depicts the relationship among the key elements.
Figure 2. Key Elements of the MTS Approach [From Ref. 6]
The starting point for the MTS process is the formation of the Integrated Process
Team (IPT). Participants of the IPT should include professionals from each of the
acquisition functional areas listed in Table 2. Additional participants may include










Table 2. Acquisition Program Planning and Management Functions [After Ref. 6]
The IPT evaluates each candidate component of a system or subsystem that has
been identified for modernization. The proposed components are either currently limiting
the operational capability of an existing system or have the potential to degrade the
operational capability or readiness of the system in the future. The evaluation focuses on
the candidate's potential to improve the readiness or performance of the system in areas
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such as enhanced availability, reduced cost of ownership, and enhanced system
capability. [Ref. 16]
The guide provides two types of data that must be considered for MTS candidates
- proactive and reactive type data. Proactive data include analysis of future system
needs, diminishing manufacturing capabilities, and lower cost opportunities, for example.
Reactive type data stem from maintenance, availability, and cost of ownership statistics
such as mean corrective maintenance time, mission capability rates, and depot
maintenance cost. [Ref. 6] Figure 3 identifies the underlying variables that makeup the
key factors of the MTS process. The related efforts in Figure 3 and the MTS initiative
complement each other. Related efforts are programs and processes such as Value
Engineering (VE); Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV); Reliability, Maintainability,
and Supportability (RMS); and Operational Support Cost Reduction (OSCR). Outputs of
the MTS approach can be grouped into pre- and post-milestone III categories. Pre-
milestone III outputs influence the acquisition strategy and Logistics Support (LS) plan.
Modernization Through Spares is supported through the use of such concepts as
performance specifications, open system designs, and CAIV principles in the design of
spares. These concepts are reflected in the solicitation document in an attempt to attract
the best technical solution to meet the program's requirements. [Ref. 6]
Post-milestone III outputs address the evaluation of existing components for
possible redesign. Degraded performance, obsolescence and emerging technologies are
the driving forces behind the MTS approach at this stage in the program's life cycle. The
components and logistics processes are analyzed to determine feasible and cost effective
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Figure 3. The MTS Process [From Ref. 5]
post-milestone III MTS considerations is that the potential savings are long-term for pre-
milestone III programs whereas the savings are generally near-term for programs past the
milestone III point. [Ref. 16]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Modernization Through Spares is an initiative that supports the acquisition
priority set forth by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology) (ASA (ALT)) to reduce Operating and Support (O&S) costs. Benefits of
MTS include technology insertion, enhanced performance and availability, and reduction
16
of total ownership costs. Disadvantages of MTS are heavy initial investments,
compatibility and interoperability challenges, and data collection, among others.
The Overarching Integrated Process Team (OIPT) for MTS published a
guidebook to assist Army managers who develop systems or buy spares. The OIPT also
developed a process to implement MTS that is useful in both Pre-Milestone III programs
and Post-Milestone III programs. The most important factor in the MTS process is the
use of an Integrated Process Team (IPT) approach with members from each of the
functional areas of acquisition and stakeholders from the user (buying activity), industry,
and contractor communities.
17
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III. THE HMMWV AND PM-LTV
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The AM General Corporation, manufacturer of the HMMWV, has a long history
of producing tactical vehicles for the Armed Forces. The AM General Corporation and
its "ancestors" began manufacturing military trucks as early as the 1940s with the
production contract for the "Jeep". Since then, they have produced several configurations
and varieties of V4-ton, 2 !/2-ton, and 5-ton tactical trucks as well as some 14- to 20-ton
truck series varieties, as depicted in Figure 4.
The High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle program started in 1979 when
AM General began preliminary design work on a 1-ton truck intended to replace the
M151 series vehicles (Jeeps) and other light tactical vehicles. AM General was awarded
a competitive prototype contract for its new light tactical vehicle from the U.S. Army in
1981. During 1982, the development and operational testing was completed for the
HMMWV, which led to the initial production contract. The U.S. Army Tank-
Automotive and Armaments Command awarded the first HMMWV production contract
in March 1983. The contract was a five-year contract, worth $1.2 billion to produce
55,000 HMMWVs. [Ref. 17] The HMMWV eventually replaced a variety of light
tactical vehicles including the M151 lA-ton utility vehicle, the M274 14-ton Mule, and the
M561 1 '/2-ton Gama Goat. Since production began in 1983, more than 150,000
HMMWVs have been delivered to the U.S. Armed Forces and more than 30 friendly
overseas nations. [Ref. 18]
The current HMMWV is a light tactical wheeled vehicle equipped with a high
performance 6.5L diesel engine, 4 speed automatic transmission, and full-time four-
19
1903 - Standard Wheel Company expands to
include Overland Automotive Company.
1908 - John North Willys purchases Overland
Automotive Company.
1912 - Willys-Overland Company formed.
I
1936 - Willys-Overland Motors, Inc formed due to
Depression-era bankruptcy reorganization.
1953 - From purchase by Henry J. Kaiser interests,
Willys Motors. Inc. is formed.
1963 - Willys Motors renamed Kaiser Jeep Corp.
1964 - Kaiser Jeep Corp. acquires
Studebaker Corp.
1970 - American Motors Corp. purchases Kaiser
Jeep Corp.
1971 - American Motors Corp. forms wholly
owned subsidiary AM General Corp.
1
~
1983 - LTV Corporation purchases AM General
and keeps as wholly owned subsidiary of
the LTV Aerospace and Defense Company.
1992 - The Renco Group, Inc. purchases
AM General Corp.
Overland "Runabout" introduced.
The popular "Whippet" is produced.
Willys-Overland granted production contract for
America's first four-wheel drive % ton utility truck.
More than 350,000 "Jeeps' produced during the 1940s.
Improved Jeeps, the M38 and M38A1, were used in
the Korean conflict. Over 150,000 vehicles produced.
Willys Motors, Inc, underbids Ford in 1962 - begins
producing the M 151 (replaced the M38A1). More
than 120,000 made in Toledo and South Bend.
Kaiser Jeep Corp assumes contract for M39 5-ton and
begins own contract to produce M44 2 '/S-ton trucks.
Nearly 1 12.000 5-ton and 150.000 2 '/.-ton produced.
AM General designs: M809 5-ton, over 92.000 made;
M939 5-ton, over 21.000 made: M9 15 truck series
( 14- to 20-ton trucks), 7,300 made.
HMMWV preliminary design begins in 1979. prototype
contract awarded in 1981, production contract awarded in
1983. Since then, more than 150.000 HMMWVs have been
delivered to the U.S. Armed Forces and over 30 friendly
overseas nations.
Figure 4. Brief History ofAM General and the HMMWV [Data from Ref. 1 7]
wheel drive. The vehicle is air transportable and can be dropped from a variety of
aircraft. The nomenclature for the base platform is M1097A2, which can be configured
to support several different missions including weapons platform, field ambulance, cargo
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and troop transport, and communications. [Ref. 19] Most of the configurations do not
affect the HMMWV's ability to climb sixty percent slopes, traverse a side slope of up to
forty percent, or ford a hard bottom water crossing up to 30 inches (without a deep water
fording kit - up to 60 inches with the kit) while carrying a payload of 2,500 - 4,400
pounds, depending on the mission. [Ref. 20]
The current acquisition strategy for PM-LTV emerged after two significant events
occurred in the late 1990s. First, in 1997, a new start program called the Light Tactical
Vehicle (LTV) was cancelled. The LTV was originally intended to replace the HMMWV
at the end of the HMMWV's Economic Useful Life (EUL). [Ref. 21] Secondly, in May
of 1998 at the direction of Congress, the Secretary of the Army was to "...submit a light
tactical wheeled strategy with the fiscal year 2000 budget" and "...include the
requirements, estimated development and acquisition costs, and estimated operation and
support costs for each alternative." [Ref. 22] The impetus for the formation of a new
acquisition strategy for the Army's light tactical vehicles stemmed from these two events.
Next, an Integrated Process Team (IPT) was formed with members from U.S.
Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), who serve as the Army's combat developers, and
PM-LTV to conduct the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to fulfill the Congressional
mandate. The IPT's results were incorporated into the formulation of the acquisition
strategy for the Project Manager, Light Tactical Vehicles (PM-LTV).
The TACOM Deputy for Systems Acquisition appointed Ms. Nancy Moulton as
the Project Manager (PM) for the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) program on June 29,
1998. As the PM for LTV, she is tasked to "...provide overall direction and guidance for
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the development, acquisition, testing, systems integration, product improvement, and
fielding [of her assigned vehicles]...." [Ref. 23] Her mission is to "...provide world-
class light tactical vehicles to meet the needs of the joint warfighting community. This
mission will be accomplished using a customer-focused approach and the following
enablers: an integrated data environment/integrated business environment, cost as an
independent variable, leveraging commercial technology and integrated process teams."
[Ref. 24] The PM-LTV falls under the Deputy for Systems Acquisition (DSA), U.S.
Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) and is headquartered in
Warren, Michigan.
To support TACOM and accomplish the PM-LTV vision and mission, PM-LTV
is organized as depicted in Figure 5. PM-LTV is not just the HMMWV, but rather a
category of vehicles that includes various configurations of the HMMWV, the Armored
Security Vehicle (ASV), the High Mobility Trailer (HMT) and the Commercial Utility
Cargo Vehicle (CUCV). However, "the U.S. Army Light Tactical Fleet has been
standardized as the ...HMMWV." [Ref. 21]
The program office performs a variety of complex tasks related to managing the
Army's LTV program such as logistics and maintenance support planning, configuration
management, quality assurance, engineering support, reliability predictions and
assessments, procurement and production planning, and cost and schedule management.
Due to their relatively small size (24 personnel), PM-LTV relies on matrix support from
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Figure 5. Program Office for LTV [From Ref. 23]
B. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
On the 25 th of January 1999, the Project Manager for Light Tactical Vehicles
(PM-LTV) published the US Army Acquisition Strategy Report for Light Tactical
Vehicles. The Army was required to prepare and submit the report to Congress with the
Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 budget, see Appendix A. This section outlines and describes
important characteristics of PM-LTV's acquisition strategy.
The acquisition strategy for PM-LTV details how the Army plans to manage the
total life cycle of the HMMWV fleet. Several organizations have impacted, influenced
and shaped the strategy either directly or indirectly. These organizations include
Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Secretary of the Army, TACOM,
TRADOC, and other service participation from the US Marine Corps, Marine Corps
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM).
The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), high level Department of the Army
(DA) executives, and General Officers provided the PM-LTV a host of guidance to
consider when formulating their strategy. A partial list of those contributions follows:
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No new start program
Fleet is aging; however, must meet Army needs until Army After Next (AAN)
Leverage commercially available technology
Introduce competition (none exists today)
Look at alternatives to mandatory replacement of vehicles reaching their EUL
Support Joint Vision 2010 and Army Force XXI goals
Support AAN goals
Maintain performance at least as good as the performance of the fleet today
Do not increase Operations and Support (O&S) costs
Consider extending the life of the HMMWV
Support the USMC replacement strategy; they are our partners
The centerpiece of their strategy is employing a three-pillar approach to comply
with the above guidance and manage the life cycle costs of the HMMWV. The three
pillars are Spiral Modernization, Maintain Production, and Recapitalization, as shown in
Figure 6. Spiral Modernization utilizes a seven-year cyclical approach to insert
commercial technologies that fulfill Army Force XXI requirements. Maintain Production
aims to acquire the necessary number of vehicles to meet the Army Acquisition Objective
(AAO) of 121,692 HMMWVs of various models [Ref. 21] and satisfy identified
requirements for the US Air Force and US Marine Corps. The goal during
Recapitalization is to extend the service life of aging HMMWVs. Although the
HMMWV fleet is aging, almost half of the vehicles have less than 18 thousand miles
accumulated from use, with the fleet's Economic Useful Life (EUL) at 15 years.
Recapitalization attempts to add 21 years to the service life of the HMMWV by
improving the Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) concurrently with
improvements in the corrosion protection of the HMMWV.
The strategy, then, describes the plan to address the shortfalls associated with the
aging HMMWV fleet, fill AAO shortages, and extend the service life of aging
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Figure 6. PM-LTV Acquisition Strategy [From Ref. 24]
HMMWVs by 21 years. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed description
for each of the pillars.
1. Spiral Modernization
The goal of spiral modernization is to cyclically improve and evolve the
HMMWV into a vehicle capable of satisfying the Joint Vision 2010 requirements
(effective around 2010) and Army After Next (AAN) requirements (effective around
2025) "at a reduced cost by developing, encouraging, and leveraging commercially
available technologies." [Ref. 21] PM-LTV identified five areas of emphasis that will
contribute to successfully accomplishing spiral modernization. Those five areas are
Operational Requirements Document Update; Technology Demonstration; System
Integration and Testing; Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support; and
Future Plans.
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The first area contributing to successful spiral modernization is Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) Update. The intent here was to address those risk issues
and challenges associated with incongruities between the fielded HMMWV and a new,
updated ORD on a cyclical basis. Each successive iteration of the spiral modernization
cycle would produce an updated ORD that delineates thresholds "...reflecting realistic
requirements for today's fleet and objectives that reflect the requirements necessary to
meet projected Force XXI requirements." [Ref. 21] Those requirements would then be
addressed and incorporated into the HMMWV through subsequent phases of the spiral
modernization process.
A Cost/Performance Trade-off IPT (with combat developer involvement)
methodology was used to mitigate the identified risk issues. The IPT is applying Cost As
an Independent Variable principles as shown in Figure 7.
Another contributor to successful spiral modernization is Technology
Demonstration. The goal here is to leverage the commercial marketplace by
incorporating existing advanced technologies into the HMMWV program; jointly
developing dual use technologies for militarized commercial components; and
invigorating competition in the marketplace through foreign comparative testing.
The System Integration and Testing (SI&T) phase (FYOO to FY02) of spiral
modernization provides Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding to
support technology insertion initiatives that are linked to ORD requirements or linked to
Operations and Support (O&S) costs savings from a systems perspective. Areas of
interest pertinent to ORD requirements include maintainability, durability, and maximum



























Figure 7. C/PT IPT CAIV Process [After Ref. 21]
corrosion prevention, electronics, and integration of the HMMWV with other
components on the Digital Battlefield, among others. Performance based specifications
at the component level will be utilized during this phase.
Following the SI&T phase and contingent upon available FY02 Funding,
Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support will increase production of the
HMMWV to modernize 100 percent of Force Packages 1 and 2 units over a 21 -year
period. Force packages are pre-defined standardized combinations of manpower and/or
equipment that provide a specific wartime capability. [Ref. 25] A unit included in Force
Package 1 has priority over a unit included in Force Package 2; Force Package 2 units
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have priority over Force Package 3 units, and so on. When combined with the
recapitalization production quantities, the intent in this phase is to improve the entire
HMMWV fleet and extend the expected life to a minimum of 21 years.
The last component supporting the spiral modernization pillar is Future Plans.
The idea here is to repeat the spiral modernization cycle every seven years. The cyclical
nature of the modernization process allows the HMMWV program to evolve with
subsequent warfighter requirements (reflected in updated iterations of the ORD), keep up
with emerging technologies, and obtain "leap ahead" technologies and integration that the
AAN may require.
2. Maintain Production
The current production efforts are needed to sustain the fleet until modernization
efforts are realized. PM-LTV identified several reasons for keeping a warm production
base [Ref. 21]:
• Provide a safety net and contingency plan if the modernized HMMWV
production contract should encounter delays.
• Allow the Army to continue to fill Army Acquisition Objective (AAO)
shortages while planning for the future.
• Meet critical interchange to high priority systems.
• Provide a means to accomplish tech inserts.
• Provide vehicles to other services.
• Fill Foreign Military Sales (FMS) orders.
The production plan reflected in the acquisition strategy calls for 136,145 units to
be produced through FY99 (103,419 for Army; remainder for USMC, USAF, and
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)). After AM General completes the fixed-price five-year
requirements contract (through FY99), a sole source extension of the current contract
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would continue to fill shortages in the AAO and support USMC requirements, potentially
to FY05, with an additional 17,259 units produced. [Ref. 21]
Operation and Support (O&S) cost reduction efforts are still emphasized
throughout this phase. For example, "corrosion prevention enhancements and high cost
driver improvement changes such as the Electric Start System (ESS) to reduce glow plug,
protective control box, starter and flywheel consumption" are pursued through the term
of the contract (potentially through FY05). [Ref. 21]
3. Recapitalization
The PM-LTV accomplishes the Recapitalization effort using two distinct phases
that attempt to extend the service life of the current HMMWV platform by 2 1 years, at an
acceptable level of O&S cost. The first phase is Prototype and Test (PAT) commencing
in FYOO and FY10, while the second phase, Production, begins in FY01, FY06, and
FY11. The first iteration of the Recapitalization process (PAT FYOO and Production
FY01) initializes the baseline for subsequent iterations.
During PAT, technology insertion initiatives directly linked to O&S cost savings
or overall improvements in vehicle performance are developed and validated utilizing
RDT&E funding. This phase establishes which initiatives and Modification Work Orders
(MWO) will be incorporated into the production of recapitalized HMMWVs. Another
task completed in this phase is the development of criterion used to screen prospective
candidates for inclusion in the recapitalization production phase. Criteria will developed
"...that will allow flexibility while addressing age, condition (corrosion), mileage,
EUL/Military Useful Life considerations, Maintenance Expenditure Limits (MEL),
excessive O&S costs, and the ability to only repair as necessary proven, reliable
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components." [Ref. 21] Economic life refers to "the period of time over which the
benefits to be gained from a system may reasonably be expected." [Ref. 26] The
purpose of MEL is to cap maintenance expenditures to prevent spending more than the
value of the vehicle on repair costs for a particular vehicle. As a vehicle ages and its
value decreases, the MEL also decreases. [Ref. 7]
The Production phase of Recapitalization incorporates efficiencies and cost
savings gained from new HMMWV production, where possible. Unanticipated upgrades
and modifications throughout the five-year production run should be minimal due to
efforts put forth in the previous phase. During routine HMMWV maintenance actions,
users will identify candidates for induction into Recapitalization Production from criteria
developed during the PAT phase. Vehicles and components too deteriorated or otherwise
unusable will be disposed of with the intent of harvesting funds (scrap or salvage value)
to reinvest in the recapitalization effort.
The PM-LTV believes this strategy represents the best plan for "the most cost
effective Life Cycle Management of the HMMWV fleet." [Ref. 21] Through spiral
modernization, continued production, and recapitalization, PM-LTV intends her
acquisition strategy to meet the mission requirements and fulfill the AAO.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The AM General Corporation began design work for the HMMWV program as
early as 1979. After receiving a competitive prototype contract in 1981, AM General
completed the development and operational testing for the HMMWV in 1982. The
TACOM awarded the first HMMWV production contract in March 1983 to AM General,
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worth $1.2 billion to produce 55,000 HMMWVs. Since production began in 1983, more
than 150,000 HMMWVs have been delivered to the U.S. Armed Forces and more than 30
friendly overseas nations.
Through a collaborative effort with members from TACOM and TRADOC, the
PM-LTV's acquisition strategy emerged while conducting an AOA, using an IPT
process, in February of 1998. The TACOM DSA then appointed Ms. Nancy Moulton as
the Project Manager (PM) for the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) program on June 29,
1998. The program office for LTV performs several tasks while managing the
HMMWV program with the assistance of representatives from TACOM and other Major
Subordinate Commands.
The centerpiece of Ms. Moulton's acquisition strategy is employing a three-pillar
approach to manage the life cycle costs of the HMMWV fleet. The end result will
achieve the AAO, extend the service life of the HMMWV by 2 1 years, and meet evolving
operational requirements. The three pillars of the acquisition strategy are Spiral
Modernization, Maintain Production, and Recapitalization.
Spiral Modernization utilizes a seven-year cyclical approach to insert commercial
technologies that fulfill Army Force XXI requirements. The seven-year cycle includes an
ORD Update; Technology Demonstration; System Integration and Testing; and
Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support.
Maintain Production aims to acquire the necessary number of vehicles to meet the
Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 121,692 HMMWVs. This facet of the acquisition
strategy depends upon an extension of the current production contract (FY99) out to
FY05.
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Recapitalization extends the service life of aging HMMWVs (from 15 to 36
years). This component of the acquisition strategy uses a two-phase approach -
Prototype and Test (PAT) is the first phase, Recapitalization Production is the second.
During the PAT phase, technological insertions that will lead to O&S cost savings or
vehicle performance improvements will be developed, validated, and selected for
incorporation into the follow-on phase. Finally, the Recapitalization Production phase




The sections that follow analyze the PM-LTV Acquisition Strategy (AS) to
determine how MTS is implemented for the HMMWV program. Activities and tasks as
delineated in PM-LTV s AS will be compared with those activities and tasks found in the
MTS OIPT's implementation guidance for MTS. The comparison will be used to
establish the extent to which PM-LTV implements MTS; identify the methods used for
MTS implementation in order to comply with the Army's strategy for MTS; and
determine if the goals of MTS have been achieved.
A timeline of key events in the development of MTS and PM-LTV' s new
acquisition strategy, as shown in Figure 8, provides a perspective of how the two
processes progressed. The MTS process and the new acquisition strategy for PM-LTV
both evolved during the latter half of the 1990s. Just as the Army redirected its emphasis
on the AOA for a light tactical vehicle to exclude a new start program, the MTS OIPT
was finalizing its guide for the implementation of MTS for the Army. A few months
after the MTS guide was published in early 1998, the DSA of TACOM appointed Ms.
Nancy Moulton as the PM for LTV. Shortly thereafter, Congress (through the House
Appropriations Committee) directed the Army to submit its strategy for light tactical
wheeled vehicles with the Army's FYOO budget. The PM-LTV analyzed the preliminary
results from the AOA, developed the AS, and published the strategy January 25, 1999,
for inclusion in the FYOO budget.
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22 Jan 96 - ASA (RDA) and AMC Memorandum k- HMMWV Identified as Test Program for
MTSw
Dec 96 - TRADOC Tasked to Conduct AOA for
Light Tactical Vehicles
28-29 May 97 - MTS Workshop held in
Huntsville, Alabama
^
Workshop a success, MTS concept defined.
w
18 Jun 97 - ASA (RDA) Memorandum k MTS OIPT Establishedw
Summer 97 - Light Tactical Vehicle New Start
Program Cancelled - AOA Efforts on Hold
Dec 97 - AOA Efforts Redirected - New Start
Program Not Included
12 Jan 98 - ASA (RDA) and AMC Memorandum w Implementation ofArmy Strategy for MTSw
Feb 98 - MTS OIPT Publishes MTS
Implementation Guide
29 Jun 98 - Ms Nancy Moulton Appointed as
PM-LTV
Summer 98 - Congress Requests Light Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle Strategy with FYOO Budget
Dec 98 - PM-LTV Reviews AOA Preliminary
Results
25 Jan 99 - PM-LTV Acquisition Strategy
Published
Figure 8. Key Events for Current PM-LTV & MTS [From Data Compiled by Author]
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B. MTS VERSUS PM-LTV ACQUISITION STRATEGY
There are three major divisions of the tenets associated with the MTS process:
those that are peculiar to programs in the Pre-Milestone HI phase; those that are peculiar
to programs in Post-Milestone III phase; and those that are generic to any program. Even
though the HMMWV program is in Phase III, Production, Fielding/Deployment, and
Operational Support (PFDOS), two of the pillars of PM-LTV's AS reflect activities
conducted in Pre-Milestone III Phases (phases 0, I, and II, are Concept Exploration,
Program Definition and Risk Reduction, and Engineering and Manufacturing
Development, respectively). Those two pillars are Spiral Modernization and
Recapitalization. The third pillar of their acquisition strategy, Maintain Production,
matches activities associated with the Post-Milestone III phase, PFDOS. The following
sections compare the PM-LTV's AS to each of the major divisions of the MTS process,
accordingly.
1. Pre-Milestone III MTS Tenets
This section addresses the activities and tasks outlined in two of the pillars of PM-
LTV's AS - Spiral Modernization and Recapitalization. The goal of MTS in the
development phases (Pre-Milestone III) is to assure developmental programs enable the
continuous updating of technology in spares throughout their useful life. The six tenets
identified from the MTS guidelines that are necessary for successful MTS
implementation for a developmental program will be compared to the PM-LTV AS and
discussed first. A section summary follows illustrating the degree of MTS
implementation for a program in the developmental phases as reflected in the PM-LTV
AS.
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Require that the system be designed as an open system. A system or product
with an open systems design is one with a design able to incorporate the newest
commercial technology, products, processes, and practices as they evolve in the
marketplace.
The PM-LTV AS does not stipulate an open design for the HMMWV in either the
Spiral Modernization or Recapitalization pillars. However, they come close to
addressing an open system design in the Spiral Modernization pillar by stating "efforts
will be made to create a system that allows more seamless integration as the highest
density vehicle on the digital battlefield to provide a 'plug & play' type adaptable combat
platform for various mission critical joint task force systems." [Ref 21] It seems
necessary to have an open systems design and architecture to achieve the desired
adaptable platform, but there was no specific language addressing an open systems
design.
Their design for the spiral modernization strategy plans for technical insertions
and the development and leveraging of commercial technologies on a seven-year cyclical
basis. Also, it is obvious that PM-LTV desires technology insertion throughout the
remainder of the HMMWV' s useful life to keep pace with existing technologies in the
marketplace and provide a system that meets the emerging requirements of the
warfighter. Without an open systems design, the HMMWV system is limited to
accepting components, subsystems, or systems that match the form, fit, and function of
the piece being replaced. Otherwise it would require extensive redesign of other
components or interfaces affected by the technology insertion that are incompatible.
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With an open systems design, you have fewer constraints placed on technical insertions
for form, fit, or function.
The PM-LTV may not be able to influence the design of the HMMWV due to its
mature design. In order to control costs, reduce the risk associated with developing a
new system, and benefit from the recapitalization of aging HMMWVs, the existing
HMMWV was chosen as the baseline for future modernization efforts. Therefore,
requiring an open systems design for the overall HMMWV system may be cost
prohibitive. However, all reengineering efforts associated with HMMWV modernization
programs could benefit from requiring an open-systems design and limit modification to
achieve future technology insertion.
Develop performance specifications at the repairable/provisioned levels. It is
important to carefully document the functional and physical system interfaces in the
performance specification to ensure the acquisition of interchangeable and interoperable
replacement parts and to ensure the opportunity exists to refresh the technology with each
subsequent spares buy.
The PM-LTV has fully embraced performance specifications. The use of
performance specifications is most evident in the Spiral Modernization pillar, although
the Recapitalization pillar will harvest some benefits from the linkage between the two
pillars (technologies discovered in the systems integration and test phase of Spiral
Modernization are incorporated into the Recapitalization effort, where practicable).
Performance specifications are emphasized both at the system and component level
during the systems integration and test phase. This provides more freedom for the
contractor to design a creative solution that meets or exceeds the requirements without
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being constrained by strict design specifications. PM-LTV should reap benefits from the
reduction of costs associated with a contractor not having to comply with multiple design
specifications, like the CECOM's User Readout (URO) for the Enhanced Position
Location Reporting System (EPLRS) project that reduced the per unit price from $4,000
to less than $1,000 (see Chapter II, section B.l. Advantages of MTS).
Use CAIVprinciples in the design ofspares. Instead of determining the level of
repair (echelon of maintenance and its corresponding location of the repair such as in the
field or maintenance depot) for a particular component, set a CAIV objective for the cost
of the component. The developer determines the level of repair based on affordability
and readiness considerations, and the support structure evolves that reflects the least-cost
spares approach.
The use of CAIV is specifically identified by PM-LTV in the Spiral
Modernization pillar, during the ORD update. The CAIV principles employed in this
stage of the modernization cycle are very beneficial to mitigate the risk of cost overruns
and designing a cost prohibitive system. Using those principles demonstrates to the user
that each performance specification has an associated cost and that trade-offs between
performance and cost will most likely be required to field an affordable system. The user
participates in the cost-benefit analysis of added requirements and makes trade-offs that
balance mission requirements and fiscal constraints.
Although the PM-LTV AS does not specifically address the use of CAIV
principles in the design of spares, it is clearly evident that the PM-LTV is concerned with
the cost of modernizing the HMMWV from a systems, fleet, and total life-cycle
perspective throughout each of the pillars of the AS. Modernization initiatives and
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technological insertions are only undertaken if they are directly related to an ORD
requirement or can demonstrate affordability and reduction in O&S costs. The recurring
theme through each of the pillars is reducing or minimizing O&S costs. Hence,
modernization techniques identified in the AS are not arbitrarily instituted without
consideration of implementation costs, and therefore the essential CAIV tenets are
addressed.
Even though all three pillars of the AS reflect a genuine concern for acquisition
and O&S costs, the details of how the PM will mitigate or eliminate those concerns could
be better articulated. The PM-LTV has set clear objectives and goals for each of the
pillars to reduce and minimize O&S costs together with introducing competition to lower
acquisition costs. But that is the desired end-state. The use of CAIV principles provides
a tool to ensure each decision contributing to component design or modernization
initiative is made with cost ramifications in mind and that the user is an active participant
in the analysis and resulting decisions. The principles increase the likelihood of
achieving the desired end-state.
How PM-LTV plans to reach the desired end-state is better articulated in the
Program Management section of the AS. It is much more clear that PM-LTV will
establish thresholds and metrics, apply CAIV processes, conduct cost/benefit and tradeoff
analyses, and use Earned Value Management (EVM) techniques to manage program
costs and performance. These techniques and procedures would have a greater impact if
they were incorporated, intertwined, and supporting each of the pillars of the AS, serving
as the roadmap and guide for EPT members to follow.
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Have the contractor maintain configuration control of product data. Giving
configuration control of product data to the contractor preserves the contractor's design
flexibility and ability to continually refresh technology.
The AS for PM-LTV does not specify who has the configuration control of
product data. The AS does stipulate that the Government will retain configuration
management control and approval authority. And, during the Spiral Modernization
effort, the control of configuration management will be exercised through performance
specifications using the current Technical Data Package (TDP) provided as a reference
document. The AS also states "we will encourage performance-based specifications
starting at the component level...." [Ref. 21]. Since they encourage performance-based
specifications for the design of technology insertion initiatives and do not direct the use
of design specifications, a fair conclusion is that they permit the contractor to retain
configuration control of the product data and will reap the benefit by allowing contractor
data control.
Employ someform of contractor logistic support. The use of contractor logistics
support may reduce the cost of spares and logistics support, particularly if the contractor
providing the support is also the production contractor. The production contractor has
intimate knowledge of the system and already has processes in place for the support of
the system and the acquisition or production of spares. The opportunity may exist to
achieve economies of scale if the production contractor also provides some form of
support.
The use of Contractor Logistic Support (CLS) in the two Pre-Milestone III pillars
was not evident. Additionally, it is unclear if CLS will be a consideration for either the
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Spiral Modernization or Recapitalization efforts. However, the Support section of the AS
reflects a deliberate desire to use contractor logistic support on an interim basis until
appropriate standard supply levels of repair parts can be established. This interim support
is directed more toward the modernization production effort and not specifically for the
acquisition of spares. Therefore, PM-LTV misses an opportunity to achieve some spares
procurement cost reductions through the production contractor's economies of scale.
Use the developer for follow-on production. The developer has extensive
knowledge of the system or product that might prove to be beneficial during the transition
from development to production. Other competition for spares procurement may be
introduced once the product data have stabilized.
PM-LTV has identified that the potential exists to have no competition for AM
General in the production phase of the Spiral Modernization pillar. Although this may be
advantageous for the PM office as they transition to the production effort from the
development phase, the opportunity to reduce the costs associated with the acquisition
of spares is lost. The PM-LTV 's mitigation plan is to enter into a teaming arrangement
with AM General to introduce competition at the component level for efforts past the
Milestone III decision. Competition has the potential to bring down the acquisition costs
of spares but may also increase the costs due to integrating components from different
manufacturers into operable subsystems or systems.
Summary of MTS development tenets. Figure 9 summarizes how well the
developmental MTS tenets are achieved by the two Pre-Milestone III pillars of PM-
LTV s AS. A solid arrow indicates the MTS tenets are well represented in the particular
pillar of the AS. A dashed arrow indicates the tenets are represented but only because of
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the benefits received by Recapitalization through Spiral Modernization Efforts. In other
words, most activities specifically delineated in the Recapitalization pillar do not
represent MTS tenets by themselves.
Require that the system be designed
as an open system
Develop performance specifications at the
Repairable/provisioned level
Use CAIV principles in the design of spares
Have the contractor maintain configuration
control of product data
Employ some form of contractor
logistics support










Figure 9. Development Tenets ofMTS and the Pre-Milestone III Phases of PM-LTV's
Acquisition Strategy [From Data Compiled by Author]
The two pillars of Spiral Modernization and Recapitalization do provide a
framework to enable the HMMWV to incorporate new technologies as they emerge in the
commercial marketplace. And as such, they appear to meet the goal of MTS for a
program in the developmental phases. However, while many of the activities conducted
in the two pillars closely resemble some of the tenets supporting an MTS strategy for a
developmental program, the activities are directed more toward the overall modernization
of the HMMWV fleet (using other techniques) and not particularly through a spares
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modernization effort. The two pillars of the AS emphasize developmental activities and
the production effort leading up to a modernized or recapitalized HMMWV, with little
emphasis for the spares acquisition. Three of the MTS tenets in Figure 9 are not
addressed by PM-LTV's AS which further illustrates that the focus of their strategy is not
necessarily toward spares modernization but rather modernization production of the
system.
2. Post-Milestone III MTS Tenets
This section compares the MTS tenets associated with a program in the
Production Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support (PFDOS) phase to those
activities and tasks outlined in the Maintain Production pillar of PM-LTV's AS. There
are three goals of MTS in the Post-Milestone III phase: update spares currently being
acquired with modern technology where the cost benefit is the greatest; leverage spares
procurement dollars to update technology within current funding levels; and capture
savings in spares acquisition and support costs for reinvestment in Army force
modernization. Four tenets were identified from the MTS guidelines that are necessary
for successful MTS implementation in a Post-Milestone III program. A section summary
follows illustrating the degree of MTS implementation for a program in the PFDOS
phase as reflected in the PM-LTV AS.
Implement a systematic and disciplined review of spares demand experience,
acquisition lead times, prices, inventories, O&S costs, failure rates, obsolescence,
repair cycle times and repair wash-out rates. The objective of this tenet is to use the
Integrated Process Team (IPT) concept to develop and prioritize a list of spares that are
the cost drivers of the system. The analysis goes beyond the acquisition cost of the spare
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and includes the factors named in the above tenet (e.g., failure rates, inventories,
acquisition lead times, etc.).
The PM-LTV uses the EPT process to conduct business and manage the HMMWV
program. Additionally, a desire to continue O&S cost reduction efforts in the Maintain
Production pillar is apparent but no specific actions or procedures are identified to
achieve those desires.
A bit more detail is provided in the Support Concept section of the AS. As stated
in that section, "...we will use a continuous process that will determine the O&S cost
drivers, provide for a cognitive technical review and recommend changes or alternatives
that will lower operating and support costs throughout the life cycle of the equipment."
[Ref. 21] It seems this statement meets the tenet's intent, although the quoted statement
is the extent of the level of detail provided to achieve O&S cost reductions. Also, it is
unclear if the focus is on the initial procurement of spares or those spares necessary to
sustain the system once fielded. The statement would be more beneficial in the Maintain
Production pillar with some additional details to provide further clarity for the IPT to
attain the desired outcome of O&S cost reduction.
The Support Concept section asserts alternative strategies such as Electronic
Commerce (EC), Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) and digital tools like Interactive
Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM) will be analyzed and utilized to the maximum
extent possible to reduce life cycle costs of the HMMWV program. These sorts of details
are precisely the missing element of the Maintain Production pillar and would
significantly improve the IPT's understanding of how to realize the O&S cost reductions.
Including (or restating, if necessary) the details in the Maintain Production pillar
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reemphasizes the importance of and the PM's commitment to reducing the life cycle
costs of the system.
Analyze the MTS spares priority ranking to determine the feasibility of
upgrading technology to reduce the spares' life cycle cost. The MTS strategy must
include a feasibility analysis that considers the state of the technology of the spare,
emerging or existing technology in the marketplace, and the impact of the new
technology integration on the total life cycle cost of the system. Aggregating the sparing
to the next higher assembly may prove to be valuable and is an important facet of the
analysis.
PM-LTV's emphasis on this tenet is much like the previous tenet. No details are
given in the Maintain Production pillar while only a glimmer of detail is contained in the
Support Concept section. Assuming "a cognitive technical review" includes a prioritized
ranking of spares modernization candidates, PM-LTV appears to adequately fulfill this
tenet. Their use of digital tools and analysis of commercial practices for implementation
in the HMMWV program should provide valuable information to accurately select and
support the MTS candidate decision, though the pillar does not make that connection
specifically.
Prepare procurement work packages for spares that enable integration of
technology upgrades as a normal part of the procurement cost. Spares contracts should
be structured to allow for the continuous upgrading of technology into spares components
where the cost of the upgrade is included in the acquisition cost.
The lack of detail in the Maintain Production pillar applies to this tenet as well.
The contracting strategy is reflected in the AS under the Business and Contracting
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Strategy section. Although the majority of the emphasis in their contracting strategy
results in modernization and recapitalization production of the HMMWV system, the
strategy provides ample emphasis and closely resembles the suggested strategy from
MTS for spares procurement. PM-LTV decidedly implements performance
specifications to competitively acquire components, which will allow the contractor
flexibility to insert technologies as they emerge, provided reengineering efforts contain
provisions for open systems architecture.
Capture savings in spares acquisition and support costs resulting from MTS
efforts for reinvestment in modernization. PM-LTV intends to capture funds generated
by the recapitalization effort of the aging HMMWVs and reinvest the funds to support the
modernization effort. The program office does not have access to any savings or
authority to reprogram funds resulting from MTS cost reduction efforts. The savings
would be reflected in reductions of requirements in the Operation and Maintenance,
Army (O&MA) account and is beyond the scope of PM-LTV s ability. However, PM-
LTV could attempt to seek "credit" for investments benefiting the O&MA account from
the Army comptroller and obtain additional procurement or RDT&E funding within the
appropriation's reprogramming limitations.
Summary of MTS PFDOS tenets. Figure 10 summarizes how well the PFDOS
MTS tenets are achieved by the Maintain Production pillar of PM-LTV's AS. Although
not specifically addressed and detailed in the pillar, other sections of the AS speak to
activities conducted to maintain production and therefore would fulfill the PFDOS tenets.
The AS of PM-LTV falls short of meeting the last goal of MTS for PFDOS programs -
capture savings in spares acquisition and support costs for reinvestment in Army force
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Implement a systematic and disciplined
review of spares demand experience...
Analyze the spares priority ranking to
determine the feasibility of upgrading.
Prepare procurement work packages for
spares that enable integration of...
Maintain Production
Capture savings in spares acquisition and
support costs resulting from MTS efforts..
Figure 10. PFDOS Tenets ofMTS and the Post-Milestone III Phase of PM-LTV's
Acquisition Strategy [From Data Compiled by Author]
modernization. An opportunity exists for PM-LTV to recapture some investment costs
for initiatives undertaken in the spirit of MTS.
3. Generic MTS Tenets
This section analyzes the MTS tenets that all programs should use regardless of
which acquisition phase the program is in and compares them to the AS for PM-LTV.
The following three tenets identified from the MTS guidelines form the framework and
foundation that is necessary for successful MTS implementation. A section summary
will illustrate the degree of MTS implementation of these generic tenets as reflected in
the PM-LTV AS.
Use an MTS IPT. The IPT members must have extensive knowledge of the
broad range of Acquisition Reform (AR) initiatives and use that knowledge to develop
and effectively execute MTS implementing tasks.
It is evident from their AS that the PM-LTV clearly believes in accomplishing
tasks using the IPT process. Many functions are completed with support from other
organizations. The current program office has used an IPT approach since the Army's
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senior leadership redirected efforts of the AOA. PM-LTV participated in the AOA and
used an IPT approach to develop their AS. They are committed to using an EPT approach
for the continued management of the HMMWV program.
The AS does not address an MTS IPT. Absent the specific identification of an
MTS IPT, the closest PM-LTV comes to achieving this is contained in the Support
Concept section. Although not labeled as an MTS IPT, the steps and actions described in
the Support Concept section reflect those actions undertaken in an MTS IPT. The CAIV
principles are understood and applied. Earned Value Management techniques are used to
minimize program costs, and intentions to reduce O&S costs are evident throughout each
of the three pillars of the AS, all accomplished utilizing "a continuous process".
However, an IPT labeled as an MTS EPT highlights its focus, direction, and mission.
Modernization is then achieved through spares, not recapitalization or production of a
new system.
Analyze overall program acquisition strategies. All strategies contained in the
AS need to be revisited with the intent of implementing MTS to achieve modernization
benefits from spares acquisitions.
The PM-LTV inherited the Army's LTV program just as the change in the
direction of the AOA occurred. PM-LTV reviewed the previous LTV AS signed by the
TACOM DSA in June of 1998. With the assistance of many outside organizations under
a working group format, PM-LTV and the group developed and refined six alternate
acquisition strategies. The group felt that the alternative selected and included in the AS
represented the best alternative to meet the ORD requirements and the AAO. Hence the
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program did receive a fresh review for modernization alternatives, but that review did not
have the requisite MTS component.
Incorporate MTS into the acquisition life cycle via the acquisition strategy. All
IPT members and program employees use the AS as a roadmap and guide for direction
and purpose. It defines their route toward the end-state and coordinates all actions to
ensure a concerted effort by all toward a common goal. Senior leadership and the PM
use the AS to communicate goals, objectives, and actions and to develop expectations of
overall program performance. The AS contains the procedures for how the program
manager will take the program from inception and development through PFDOS and
disposal. If MTS is not intertwined as a common thread throughout the entire AS,
competing strategies will deteriorate MTS efforts, DPT members will not be aligned on
the proper azimuth toward a universal goal of achieving MTS, and opportunities will be
lost for MTS to positively influence the management of the program's life cycle costs.
MTS is not an inherent part of PM-LTV's AS. In their Spiral Modernization
pillar, MTS is only casually mentioned - as technological improvements are discovered
during the system integration and test phase of the pillar, they "...will be integrated into
modernized HMMWV production and inserted into the fleet as modifications or
Modernization Through Spares initiatives." [Ref. 21] The clear focus of the pillar is
modernized HMMWV production with no detail in the AS of how to achieve the MTS
initiatives. The only other mention of MTS is in the Other Important Considerations
section of their AS. They essentially reiterate the same intent and level of detail for dual
use technology insertion into the fleet as MTS initiatives, as they did for technologies
discovered during systems integration and test.
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Summary ofMTS generic tenets. Figure 1 1 illustrates the degree that the PM-
LTV AS meets the generic tenets of MTS. Since no arrows are connecting the tenets
with the AS, the figure shows the tenets are not achieved through PM-LTV's AS. Even
though PM-LTV uses the IPT process, they lack an IPT with an MTS focus. The
HMMWV program did receive a new look but without the necessary MTS flavor. Lastly,
PM-LTV did not incorporate MTS with the AS.
Use an MTS IPT
Analyze overall program acquisition
strategies
PM-LTVA c i]ids ition
Strategy
Incorporate MTS into the acquisition life
cycle via the acquisition strategy
Figure 1 1. Generic Tenets ofMTS and PM-LTV"s Acquisition Strategy
[From Data Compiled by Author]
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following section provides conclusions drawn from the analysis of the
Army's MTS implementation strategy compared with the Acquisition Strategy for PM-
LTV. The latter sections discuss recommendations for PM-LTV as a result of the
analysis and suggest areas for further research.
The Acquisition Strategy for PM-LTV is nothing short of remarkable. The PM-
LTV has developed a plan under an adverse and multifaceted set of constraints while
meeting several differing objectives. Through a continuing IPT process utilizing the
tools of Acquisition Reform, PM-LTV has ensured the warfighter's present and emerging
requirements will be met. The end-state of their AS is a modernized HMMWV utilizing
recent technologies infused into new production and recapitalized vehicles, extending the
useful life of the vehicle by 21 years.
Their creative, three-pronged approach employs techniques and initiatives for
modernization of the HMMWV system. Of particular interest is the emphasis on
recapitalization to remanufacture a portion of the aging HMMWV fleet because this is
where MTS could arguably provide the most benefit to the program. However, little
emphasis is placed on utilizing MTS to improve the overall performance of the fleet and
reduce O&S costs.
The MTS guidelines and the current AS for the LTV emerged within the same
year (please refer to Figure 8). Perhaps the program office did not have adequate time to
implement the MTS strategy and amply incorporate MTS into their AS. The working
group assigned to conduct the AOA for the Army's LTV was organized and met before
51
the MTS guidelines were published. Since the AOA results were an integral part of PM-
LTV's AS, the AS reflected how the AOA analyses were conducted separately without
the benefit of the MTS guide. Had the MTS guide been published earlier or the AOA
occurred after the guidelines were published, the AS most probably would have a more
distinct and robust MTS presence.
The PM-LTV strategy provides a structure that is not too distant from the MTS
strategy suggested by the MTS OIPT. Some of the MTS tenets are met by actions carried
out by the AS, although they are not exact replicas of the tenets. Clearly, the focus of
their AS is modernization through recapitalization and modernization production, not
modernization through spares. However, if the focus was redirected toward spares and
the acquisition of spares, many of the same processes and procedures in the AS could
easily be transformed in the AS to create an MTS strategy. The current AS reflects
procedures to achieve a modernized HMMWV fleet, but it does so without ample MTS
attention. Therefore, the AS falls short of the Army's MTS implementation goal.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The PM-LTV should fully incorporate the MTS strategy into the PM-LTV AS by
referring to the MTS OIPT's guidelines. Their AS currently possesses many of the
procedures and actions necessary for successful MTS implementation. Yet without the
MTS emphasis well dispersed throughout the AS, the necessary importance and guidance
for the conduct of spares acquisition is absent.
An important aspect of MTS implementation is the application of CAIV
principles throughout the acquisition life cycle. We recommend that the PM-LTV clarify
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the expansion of CAIV principles beyond the "Update ORD" phase of the Spiral
Modernization pillar. PM-LTV should dovetail the principles in concert with MTS
implementation and reflect the importance of CAIV throughout the AS. Placing a greater
emphasis on CAIV principles reinforces the intent to control life cycle costs.
The PM-LTV has to emphasize the use of an open systems architecure - a key
enabler of MTS. In the absence of an open systems design, modifications are limited to
accepting components, subsystems, or systems that match the form, fit, and function of
the piece being replaced. Otherwise, extensive redesign of other components or
interfaces affected by the technology insertion that are incompatible would be necessary.
The PM-LTV would benefit by more efficient reengineering efforts that focus on
technological insertions unconstrained by form, fit, and function.
Along with a greater emphasis on CAIV principles, PM-LTV should articulate the
implementing tasks necessary to achieve her objectives (the use of CAIV might be one of
the implementing techniques). The end-state of a modernized HMMWV with a concern
toward life cycle cost reductions is evident in each of the strategy's pillars. However,
implementing tasks for each of the pillars are needed to provide a guiding light for IPT
members to follow. Implementing tasks spelled out in each of the pillars funnels effort
toward achieving the goals of the AS. Those implementing tasks must also reflect the
significance of MTS implementation for technological infusion and cost reduction of
spares.
PM-LTV needs to exploit the opportunity to recapture some of the investment
dollars utilized while conducting MTS efforts. Any funds reimbursed could be
reinvested to finance the other modernization facets of the AS within the limitations of
the appropriations.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The Army's LTV program and modification techniques it used provide a plethora
of opportunities for further research. A few possible research questions to be answered
are:
• How do the modernization efforts conducted by PM-LTV compare with other
modification strategies such as block upgrades or SLEP?
• Could any of the modernization efforts conducted by PM-LTV be
incorporated in the MTS guidelines?
• What other modification techniques should be used in concert with MTS?
• To what extent is MTS implemented in the Army? Are the MTS guidelines
utilized? Are they useful?
• How successful has PM-LTV been in implementing their modernization
strategy?
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PM-LTV Mission
The Project Manager for Light Tactical Vehicles will
provide world-class light tactical vehicles to meet the
needs of the joint warfighting community. This
mission will he accomplished using a customer-
focused approach and the following key enablers: an
integrated data environment/integrated business
environment, cost as an independent variable,




The purpose of this Acquisition Strategy Report (ASR) is to summarize the acquisition
strategy for U.S. Army Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV). The term LTV does not refer to a
vehicle, but rather a category of vehicles. The U.S. Army Light Tactical Vehicle fleet has been
standardized as the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). There have been
102,747 HMMWVs procured through Fiscal Year 1998 for the U.S. Army alone, with an Army
Acquisition Objective of 121,692.
This strategy is a life cycle management strategy for the fleet of 121,692 HMMWVs.
TRADOC has confirmed that this fleet size will not be reduced with the downsizing of the force;
in fact, it may increase slightly due to new missions and roles for the light fleet.
It was envisioned that the HMMWV would be replaced at the end of its Economic Useful
Life (EUL) by a new start program called Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV). In 1997, the new start
LTV program was cancelled. Congress requested that the Army submit a strategy supported by
an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). A HMMWV AOA was then conducted with preliminary
results presented on January 6, 1999 to the Study Advisory Group (SAG). To meet the deadline
set by Congress to have a strategy submitted to them with the FY00 budget submission, a joint
TACOM/TRADOC Integrated Process Team (IPT) was formed. The PM's strategy evolved
concurrently with the conduct of the AOA. PM-LTV, to augment the AOA, did other
complementary analyses. From November 1998 to January 1999, a concentrated effort was put
forth to explore all feasible alternatives. Emerging AOA results were used by the IPT to
formulate the final PM-LTV strategy, ensuring all alternatives were fully considered and that the
optimum solution was defined.
In the final analysis, the PM Strategy has not changed significantly from that approved by
the TACOM Deputy for Systems Acquisition (DSA) in February 1998. It is still a three-pillar
strategy. The three pillars of the strategy are:
1) Modernize the fleet through a spiral modernization cycle of incremental upgrades to
the HMMWV design every seven years, accomplished under competitively awarded
development contracts, followed by competitively awarded production contracts for
the modernized HMMWVs, which achieve the evolving Joint Vision XXI and Army
After Next (AAN) requirements;
2) Maintain current production until competition can be generated to develop and
produce a modernized HMMWV to meet the needs of Army interchange, Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), and other services (i.e., the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)) at
least through FY03, with options to go to FY05;
3) Recapitalize our initial investment in the aging fleet to extend the life of the vehicles
by 21 years by using innovative approaches from industry, and leveraging and
integrating the technology insertions that become available from the modernization
efforts.
The most significant difference in today's PM-LTV Strategy versus the February 1998
strategy is the shift from the Hybrid-Remanufacturing concept, with its target of providing an
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additional six years of service life, to the Recapitalization concept which, through a broader,
more flexible range of repair, targets an additional 21 years of service life. Only the expanded
scope of the Recapitalization concept provides the opportunity to replace corroded and
structurally weakened frame rails with a design incorporating a more advanced corrosion
protection package. This expanded scope, addressing the vehicle frame rails, is critical to
achieving an additional 21 years of service life. This is a significant change to this portion of the
strategy, which is based on the results of the AOA. The AOA indicated a significant potential
cost avoidance by adopting this approach over Hybrid-Remanufacturing due to reduced number












































Spiral modernization is possible due to the fact that the HMMWV is a world-class system
that maintains overmatch capabilities essential to our warfighters. These capabilities can be met
by no other vehicle in this class today. Therefore, incremental improvements over a span of 21
years are considered adequate to meet the user's needs. Due to the limitations of corrosion
protection methods, extending the life of a light vehicle beyond 21 years is questionable. The
modernized HMMWV will be competed using a performance specification, with the HMMWV
TDP provided for reference to encourage commonality. PM-LTV and TRADOC are working
together using Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) to evolve the HMMWV ORD
requirements and develop an affordable performance specification. As one of the IPT members
said: "We are putting more Hum in the HMMWV!" The result will be a High Mobility




PM-LTV used the following guidance, received from the Army Acquisition Executive
(AAE), high level Department of the Army (DA) executives, and General Officers in
formulating this strategy:
No new start program
No "leap ahead" capability requirements exist, now or in the near future
HMMWV is the basic light tactical vehicle for Army XXI
Fleet is aging; however, must meet Army needs until AAN
Leverage commercially available technology
Introduce competition, none exists today
Work within the existing budget
Provide a 100% solution for maintaining fleet readiness
Look at alternatives to mandatory replacement of vehicles reaching their EUL
Evaluate the HMMWV EUL
Support Joint Vision XXI and Army XXI goals
Support AAN goals
Maintain overmatch capability consistent with the needs of the maneuver force
Maintain performance at least as good as the performance of the fleet today
Do not increase Operations and Support (O&S) costs
Look at extending the life of the HMMWV
Support the AOA conducted by TRADOC Analysis Center-Ft. Lee (TRAC-Lee)
Consider all alternatives
Support the USMC replacement strategy; they are our partners
Deliver an Army-approved Acquisition Strategy, supported by the AOA, by 30 Jan 99
Working through this difficult and complex problem, PM-LTV and the IPT developed
the strategy detailed in this document, which contains a solution meeting all of the above
elements and balances all the known requirements from a systems perspective. PM-LTV made
two key assumptions in building this strategy: (1) The Acquisition Category level will remain
ACAT III; and (2) an adequate and stable funding stream will be established and maintained to
support its execution.
The essence of this strategy is that it extends the life of the HMMWV (to 21 years) to
meet the mission requirements, while minimizing the impact on the funding requirements in the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM); eliminates the spikes in procurement dollars required;
and creates a stable level of funding as well as sound execution strategy over the life cycle of the
fleet. It also enables a more gradual and stable strategy for a future system, should it become
needed to meet AAN requirements in 2025.
PM-LTV believes this strategy offers the lowest cost solution given today's requirements.
Although there is an anticipated increase in O&S costs in the existing fleet until all vehicles can
be modernized or recapitalized, this burden is difficult to quantify and substantiate. Predictions,
however, forecast that vehicles could remain in the field ten additional years before O&S costs
accumulate beyond the acquisition cost to replace the vehicles. Due to the large fleet size and
the objective to keep the budget to a minimum, some of the current HMMWVs will remain in the
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fleet up to 36 years under this strategy. PM-LTV will employ a fleet management strategy as
part of the Recapitalization program that strives to recapitalize all vehicles before their
cumulative O&S costs, after year 15, exceed the cost of acquiring a new vehicle. PM-LTV also
believes that the modernized HMMWV portion of this strategy offers the most affordable means
to mature commercial technology, make it available, and leverage the commercial production
base to satisfy the Army XXI ORD requirements.
This strategy defines broad concepts, timelines, milestones, and resources which, when
executed, will result in the most cost effective Life Cycle Management of the HMMWV fleet.
The detailed content of the Modernization and Recapitalization plans and contracts will be
determined through comprehensive engineering and cost analyses employing progressive
analytical tools. These efforts are underway, concurrent with efforts to refine the ORD
requirements, and will proceed according to the program schedule.
This strategy is built on collaborative efforts of many DA organizations and with the
participation of the USMC, Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM). Led by
PM-LTV, numerous organizations pulled together in the true spirit of an IPT to accomplish the
AOA, other complementary analyses and thinking adventures, and to innovate the best strategy
to provide adequate readiness at the lowest possible life cycle cost. Please accept my special
thanks to all those who supported this effort.
This document is fully coordinated within the U.S. Army and was approved by the U.S.
Army Acquisition Executive on January 25, 1999. Concurrences on the PM-LTV Strategy
include the following: Director of Strategic and Tactical Land Systems, Office of the Secretary
of Defense; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Systems Management and Horizontal Integration; Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff for Force Development; Deputy Asssistant Secretary of the Army for Plans,
Programs and Policy; Director of Assessment and Evaluation; and the Commanding General,
U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM).
^^^^^^^^^
NANCY A. MOULTON
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This document defines the Project Manager. Light Tactical Vehicle's (PM-LTV) strategy
for executing Life Cycle Management of the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV) fleet. This strategy was developed at the direction of Congress. It builds on the data
and conclusions presented in the AOA conducted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), also at the direction of Congress.
"... the Committee directs that the Secretary ofthe Army submit a
light tactical wheeled strategy with thefiscal year 2000 budget. The plan
is to include the requirements, estimated development and acquisition
costs, and estimated operation and support costsfor each alternative.
"
Given the realities of budget constraints and the Army leadership decision not to pursue a
'"new start'' program for the Light Tactical Vehicle, this strategy details the most cost effective
approach to meeting the Army's light vehicle mission requirements through Force XXI. It
utilizes a three pillar concept consisting of (a) maintaining current production, (b) modernizing
the design for future production, and (c) recapitalizing existing fleet assets.
This strategy does not rely on 'leap ahead" technologies and, therefore, is not jeopardized
by the inherent risks to cost and schedule that such an approach presents. It does require a
constant and realistic funding stream to prevent fleet aging and mileage from overwhelming the
Army Operating and Support (O&S) budget and expanding mission requirements from outpacing
fleet capabilities.
The light vehicle requirements for the Army After Next (AAN) are now just emerging. It
is unlikely that they could be met by even an enhanced HMMWV design. Should that prove to
be the case, a '"new start" program employing "'leap ahead" technology would be required. This
strategy is designed to service the Army light tactical truck missions until that time.





A. Joint Mission Element Need Statement
The HMMWV Joint Mission Element Needs Statement (JMENS) described a multi-
service requirement for a vehicle platform capable of transporting payloads from 1/4 to 5/4 tons
and adaptable to combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. Six primary
functional objectives were established which included mobility/agility, payload, survivability,
transportability, logistics (emphasis on commonality), and training. The JMENS was approved
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 1980. Included in the approval was the exemption of
the HMMWV program from Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) procedure,
and assignment of the program to the Department of the Army for execution.
The JMENS was amended in December 1989 to establish the requirement for the ''heavy
HMMWV," which increased the payload, towed load, and transportability performance criteria
over the original model.
In 1990, the Army approved an addendum to the JMENS for a modification kit for the
Ml 025 and Ml 026 HMMWV. This modification satisfies mission requirements of scout units in
heavy maneuver battalions by increasing reconnaissance/target acquisition, communications, and
reporting capabilities.
The JMENS was again amended in September 1993 to establish the requirement for the
"Up-Armor HMMWV," which addresses the increased ballistic protection needed to support
reconnaissance and military police missions.
B. HMMWV Operational Requirements Document
In March 1996, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) requested that
TRADOC review, consolidate, and revise the JMENS and issue a light tactical vehicle
Operational Requirements Document (ORD). In May 1997, TRADOC released a draft Light
Tactical Vehicle (LTV) ORD for world-wide staffing. During the summer of 1997, the Army
Vice Chief of Staff withdrew support for the LTV new start Program. TRADOC released a draft
"HMMWV II" ORD m December 1997. The draft release, dated 20 October 1998, was used as
the basis for conducting the AOA. PM- LTV is assisting in the refinement of the ORD through
the application of cost/benefit analyses and Cost As An Independent Variable (CA1V) techniques
targeted at the establishment of realistic thresholds and objectives. The target date for the release
of the final ORD is March 1999.
C. Pure Fleet
In 1990, the DCSOPS directed that all units below Corps level be "pure fleeted" with the
HMMWV due to the limited mobility of the Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV). In




D. Crew Protection Kit Operational Requirements Document
The Crew Protection Kit (CPK) ORD was approved by TRADOC in January 1990. It
defines the requirement for increased crew protection for tactical wheeled vehicles, where
needed, while operating throughout the area of operation. The CPK will provide protection for
the crew against small arms fire, artillery/mortar fire, mines, submunitions, and improvised
explosive devices. The kit design concept focuses on the protection of the individual crew
members as opposed to the entire crew compartment, and provides flexibility in the level of
protection dependent upon the threat.
E. Army Acquisition Objective
Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) Totals
Trk. Util: Cgo/Trp Carrier, w/w
4.6%
Trk, Util: Hvy Variant
15.4% Trk, Util: Exp Capacity Trk
,





Trk, Util: S250 Shelter Carrier
1.3%
Trk, Util: Armt Carrier, Armd
w/w
0.2%
Trk, Util: TOW Carrier, Armd
1.6%
Trk, Ambulance: 2 Litter, Armd
0.1%
Trk, Util: Armt Carrier, Armd
0.5%
Trk, Ambulance: 4 Litter, Armd
2.3%
Trk, Util: Cgo/Trp Carrier
65.0%
The current AAO calls for the procurement of 121,692 HMMWVs of various models.
This figure represents the combined total of Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E),
Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), and Interchange Customer requirements.
F. Legislative Requirements
In addition to the operational requirements, vehicle design is governed by federal
regulations:
• Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)
• Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR)





A. Process, Timeline, Concurrent Development
This HMMWV acquisition strategy is the result of considerable effort by the entire
tactical vehicle community over several years to determine the best course or action to support
the Army's light truck needs for Force XXI. Unlike many other programs that proceed in a more
linear manner in their development of concepts and analysis of alternative solutions, the current
HMMWV program has proceeded on multiple concurrent paths. First, the Army initiated an
Analysis of Alternatives, described below, to help clarify options for the HMMWV fleet.
Second, the PM-LTV must plan to support an increasing number of HMMWVs approaching 15
years of age considering economic, operational, and engineering useful life. Third, the budget
process requires input to ensure that funds will be available to support the acquisition strategy.
This section describes the historical basis for this acquisition strategy and the concurrent events
affecting it.•6
B. Analysis Of Alternatives
The AOA is an independent analysis which indirectly challenges the ORD requirements
by determining which study alternative is the most cost and operationally effective. AOA
findings provide analytic underpinning to support a recommendation and decision to continue
further development of the programmed system. The AOA is not prepared to specifically
support the programmed system described in the ORD. The analysis results assist the Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) to decide whether the programmed system should continue. If
conditions warrant, the MDA may direct updates to the AOA for subsequent decisions." The
HMMWV AOA was prepared to provide the MDA and PM-LTV the analysis on which to build
a high quality program strategy, which is required to be submitted to Congress with the Army's
budget no later than 30 January 1999.
1 . Background
The initial AOA began with a recognition by the Army that new and improved
automotive technologies were appearing in commercial vehicles and that use of these
technologies could enhance HMMWV performance and readiness, as well as reduce O&S costs. 3
In December 1996, the Army tasked TRADOC to conduct an AOA and consider alternatives that
included procuring a new light tactical vehicle (new start) to meet ORD requirements.
A SAG was formed to control, direct, and review study efforts. It was chaired by the
Assistant DCSOPS for Force Development and by the Director for Assessment and Evaluation,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development & Acquisition). SAG
members were:
• Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research)
• Technical Advisor to the DCSOPS
" TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, Force Development, paragraph 9-3.
3




• Deputy Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation
• Commander, U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM)
• Senior representative from TRADOC
Subsequently, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee (HAC), in its review of the
FY98 budget, directed the Army to provide a report by 15 September 1997 outlining the
lightweight tactical vehicle alternatives which the Army planned to evaluate. The report was to
include the requirements, estimated development and acquisition costs, and estimated O&S costs
for each alternative.
2. HMMWV Family Life Cycle Management IPT
In December 1997, the TACOM Deputy for Systems Acquisition (DSA) chartered an IPT
to develop a fleet management plan for the HMMWV fleet through FY 12. IPT objectives
included the following:
• Implement and integrate Total Life Cycle Fleet Management requirements as
developed by the group based on statutory, regulatory, and program requirements.
• Accelerate the development of a HMMWV Family of Vehicles Fleet Management
Plan as a living document.
• Resolve cost, schedule, performance, and supportability problems.
Working groups were formed to study current fleet status, modernization alternatives,
and sustainment issues. The modernization working group had members from across TACOM
and was headed by PM-LTV. The working group developed alternatives for continuing
HMMWV production, remanufacturing older vehicles, and buying commercial vehicles.
In February 1998, these alternatives were briefed to the TACOM DSA, who used them to
initiate a conceptual LTV acquisition strategy consisting of continued production of HMMWVs
for interchange customers, procurement of a new HMMWV-like vehicle from either a military or
commercial vehicle manufacturer, and a hybrid-remanufacturing program to include Inspect and
Repair Only As Necessary (IROAN) criteria and some equipment improvements. This strategy
did not recommend funding beyond what was in the budget and did not support improvements to
more than approximately 22% of the HMMWV fleet. In August 1998, this strategy was briefed
to the AAE, who directed the strategy be expanded to support the AAN program and improve all
of the HMMWV fleet.
3. Commercially Based Tactical Truck
While developing the conceptual strategy, the National Automotive Center (NAC)
Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) program gained the interest of the TACOM
DSA and other Army leadership as a way to add commercial involvement to the conceptual LTV
acquisition strategy. The NAC participated in the HMMWV Life Cycle IPT modernization
working group and a notional COMBATT-type commercial truck was included in an alternative.





In the summer of 1997, Army support for a new start LTV program diminished and the
AOA effort was put on hold. In December 1997, the AOA effort was redirected based on new
guidance from the Army leadership, which redefined the alternatives, eliminating a new start.
Following the redirection of the AOA, a working group formed in February 1998 with
representatives from TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC)-Lee, TRAC-White Sands Missile
Range (WSMR). Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), TACOM Fleet Planning
Office, and PM-LTV. Additional assistance came from DCSOPS, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition (OASA(RDA)), U.S. Army
Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC), and the TRADOC System Manager for Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle Modernization (TSM-TWVM). The working group developed and refined the
alternatives into the following (See Appendix D for details):
Alternative 1 . Conduct an Extended Service Program (ESP)
Alternative 2A. Procure a Modernized HMMWV. The study did not quantify
improvements in vehicle performance.
Alternative 2B. Procure a Commercial Vehicle. This alternative would procure
commercial trucks, such as might result from the COMBATT program, for standard and
shelter carrier roles. In addition, the RG-31 Nyala mine-protected vehicle was included
for the armament carrier role.
Alternative 3. Conduct a Hybrid-Remanufacture Program. This tailors and expands the
IROAN concept to include technology insertion, application of open Modification Work
Orders (MWO), safety improvements, and other vehicle improvements determined to be
affordable under a cost cap of one-half the cost of a new HMMWV.
Alternative 4. Procure a Combination of Alternatives - June 1998 PM strategy. This
alternative represented the concept of the three-pillared HMMWV acquisition strategy. It
included continued HMMWV production for Army interchange and other service
customers, a modernized HMMWV for Force Packages 1 and 2, and a hybrid-
remanufacturing program to extend the life of HMMWVs in Force Packages 3 and 4.
Alternative 4. Procure a Combination of Alternatives - December 1998 PM Strategy.
This alternative was developed as emerging AOA results indicated that Alternative 4 -
June 1998 PM strategy was less affordable than was earlier believed. This alternative
differed from June 1998 version in that the hybrid-remanufacture pillar was replaced by a
recapitalization pillar to allow for more extensive improvements and, most importantly,
providing the opportunity to replace corroded and structurally weakened frame rails. By
expanding the scope to include replacement of frame rails with an advanced corrosion
prevention package, it is feasible to extend the useful life to 21 years.





Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) for shelter carrier roles and the XM1 1 17 Armored Security
Vehicle (ASV) for armament carrier roles.
In the summer of 1998, the HAC again requested the Army submit a light tactical
wheeled vehicle strategy with the Army's FYOO budget. In the same period, the Senate
Appropriations Committee directed the Army to evaluate the John Deere GATOR and its
potential to meet future light vehicle requirements. The GATOR is a six wheel, four wheel drive
light utility tractor offered by Deere & Company to support maintenance of golf courses and
other large lawn turf areas. The GATOR analysis was included in the AOA as an annex.
The Study Director briefed AOA progress to the SAG in June 1998. A significant
outcome of the briefing was an increased emphasis on developing the analytical foundation for
AOA assumptions about military vehicle EUL. The TACOM Fleet Planning Office reviewed
existing data and expanded their ongoing EUL analysis. Their work resulted in an adjustment
(for AOA purposes) from 14 to 15 years for HMMWV EUL. In December 1998, preliminary
AOA results were prepared for the SAG and a final report is planned for March 1999.
In January 1999, the Study Director briefed the SAG on preliminary results of the AOA.
The SAG agreed with the general results and methodology of the AOA. In addition, TRADOC
was requested to consider a potential mix of military and commercial vehicles as an excursion
similar to Excursion 1 (described above in the AOA alternatives). TRADOC was also requested
to reconsider the ORD Key Performance Parameters (KPP) to simplify them and reduce their
number.
C. Analysis of Results
PM-LTV analyzed the AOA preliminary results to determine whether Alternative 4-
December 1998 Strategy was the best choice among the alternatives. Subsequent to selecting
Alternative 4, the PM-LTV IPT further enhanced the strategy to extend the service life goal to 21
years and to establish an objective to cap the cost of Recap to 60% of the cost of a new
modernized HMMWV. Following is the result of the PM-LTV assessment of the AOA
alternatives and rationales for the decisions made for this acquisition strategy. The AOA
alternatives involving single actions (1, 2A, 2B, 3, Excursion 1) were eliminated because, by
themselves, they did not affect enough of the entire HMMWV fleet. Alternatives 4 - June 1998
and 4 - December 1998 are combinations of the other single action alternatives and offer much
more benefits to the entire fleet.
Base Case - used only as a basis for comparison.
• Does not meet Army requirements for Force XXI.
• It assumes that new vehicles are never purchased once the AAO is reached.
Alternative 1 (ESP) - eliminated.
• ESP alone cannot meet ORD requirements.
• Digitized Army requirements not met.




Alternative 2A (Improved HMMWV) - eliminated
• Best alternative with greatest potential to meet ORD requirements.
• Best alternative to meet Joint Vision XXI, Army XXI and AAN objectives and
evolving requirements.
• Best alternative for potential O&S cost reductions.
Alternative 2B (Commercial Truck) - eliminated
• Commercial truck alone cannot meet ORD requirements.
• Crew protection kit and armament mission high risk.
• Shelter Carrier medium risk.
• Mixed fleet option for standard mission to be evaluated.
Alternative 3 (Hybrid-Remanufacture) - eliminated
• Hybrid-Remanufacture alone does not meet ORD requirements.
• Digitized Army requirements not met.
• Joint Vision XXI, Army XXI and AAN objectives not met.
• Minimal technology insertion; minimal O&S cost reduction.
• High risk; assumes multiple reman cycles for same vehicle.
Alternative 4 (June 1998 PM Strategy) - eliminated
• Has same potential to meet requirements as Alternative 4 (Dec 98).
Excursion 1 (LMTV and Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) in Certain Roles) - eliminated
• Does not meet critical transportability and mobility requirements in ORD.
• Offers good alternative for mission capability.
• O&S costs are much higher.
Alternative 4 - December 1998 PM Strategy - selected
• Spiral Modernization cycles allow improvements to meet ORD requirements over
time through new production.
• Current production is maintained until the first competitive Spiral Modernization
contract can be awarded.
• Recapitalization lowers cost of ownership and integrates technology insertions to
meet only critical needs.
• Assumes a burden of O&S costs for vehicles beyond 15 years.
• Targets lowest level quantities and stretched out production to FY25 to meet AAN.
• Assumes service life goal to 21 years due to 22-year corrosion protection potential.
Parallel efforts by PM-LTV and TRADOC determined that:
• The Improved HMMWV is the only alternative that has the potential to meet ORD
requirements for Force XXI.
• The Commercial Truck, LMTV, and ASV alternatives are not acceptable to Army
users because they do not meet critical mobility and transportability requirements.
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• Recapitalization should be pursued only if there is insufficient funding to buy only
Improved HMMWVs.
• Recapitalization can lead to a significant cost avoidance when compared to other
alternatives.
The remainder of this document describes the strategy that PM-LTV intends to
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:?-Fr-2023 PROGRAM GRAND TOTALS
The HMMWV program was originally designated as a "non-major" system and was
delegated to Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) for In Process Review (IPR)
approval. IPR approval was granted in February 1983 and the production contract was awarded
in March 1983. The program is currently in Phase III (Production and Deployment). Since the
award of the initial production contract through FY99, 136,145 units will have been produced;
103,419 for Army and the remainder for the United States Air Force (USAF), USMC, and
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). HMMWV production continues under a fixed price, five year
requirements contract with AM General.
B. Program Focus





• Modernize: Leverage advancements in commercial and military truck technology for
insertion in the HMMWV fleet which increase system performance to more closely
achieve ORD requirements and reduce O&S costs. Improved technologies developed
and tested under an R&D effort will be integrated into modernized HMMWV
production and inserted into the fleet as modifications or Modernization Through
Spares initiatives.
• Maintain Production: Continue to fill shortages within the AAO, to the extent
allowed by budget, and satisfy requirements for interchange customers, other
services, and foreign sales until a modernized HMMWV can be put into production.
This will be accomplished by continuing HMMWV production under the existing
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract with an extension at least through FY03 with options
through FY05.
• Recapitalize: Extend fielded vehicle service life and reduce O&S costs of the
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No New
Starts
The Spiral Modernization pillar of our strategy will concentrate in a cyclic manner to
meet the current and emerging requirements for the HMMWV fleet through technical insertions
into the HMMWV program. With each cycle, HMMWVs will be produced that more fully meet
the Light Tactical Vehicle requirements of FORCE XXI doctrine as identified in the ORD. The
HMMWV represents a mature design which requires considerable revision to meet those
requirements in an affordable manner both from the acquisition and operational support




defining the near term technologies available, (b) re-evaluating the operational requirements
through the ORD/CAIV process, (c) through a System Integration & Test (SI&T) phase,
validating and testing those technologies and incorporating them into the HMMWV in the most
cost effective manner possible. The result will be a Modernized HMMWV that is capable of
satisfying the Joint Vision XXI requirements. Under this strategy, the HMMWV will continue to
evolve over time to meet AAN requirements at a reduced cost by developing, encouraging, and
leveraging commercially available technologies. This is depicted in the summary diagram and
will be expanded upon in the following paragraphs.
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1 . Operational Requirements Document Update
The updated ORD is intended to articulate thresholds that focus on reflecting realistic
requirements for today's fleet and objectives that reflect the requirements necessary to meet
projected Force XXI requirements. Program risks associated with this strategy being applied to
the existing HMMWV are that KPPs may not allow sufficient flexibility to meet cost objectives.
There is the risk that without careful consideration, interrelated requirements will result in actual
physical impossibilities. Components planned for FORCE XXI, and developed by independent
project managers, may not integrate onto a HMMWV platform. The desired incremental
protection levels (Crew Protection Kits) for all vehicle models are a significant challenge to
integrate on the existing HMMWV platform. We are mitigating this risk through close
cooperation with the Combat Developer using an IPT approach in review of the current iteration
of the document. They have agreed that CAIV principles should be applied. Currently a
Cost/Performance Trade-off IPT is identifying the costs and risks associated with the
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a. Commercially Based Tactical Truck
PM-LTV is participating with the NAC to leverage the commercial marketplace and
through a cost sharing relationship develop dual use technologies for militarized commercial
components. This will be demonstrated by incorporating the technologies in modified Ford
F350. Dodge RAM and AM General HMMWVs. These are aimed at demonstrating the
feasibility of obtaining HMMWV-like performance for selected ORD requirements as well as
providing technology insertions into the HMMWV program. This program is scheduled to be
completed in FY99 and will dovetail into the HMMWV modernization schedule
b. Foreign Comparative Testing
Currently, the HMMWV clearly is the world leader in light payload, tactical vehicles.
However, recently, companies from other countries have introduced vehicles that offer mobility
approaching HMMWV capability. PM-LTV plans to pursue a foreign comparative testing
program, concurrent with, and in collaboration with, the COMBATT program, to encourage
foreign competition during the competitive selection process leading to the award of the
development contract. The PM-LTV is coordinating with the National Ground Intelligence
Center, TACOM, and the Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) Office to arrange for funding to
acquire and test foreign equivalents to the HMMWV. The FCT program for the HMMWV will
begin in FY99 and will be completed in FYOO with a comparative test of foreign sourced light
tactical vehicles against the HMMWV ORD KPPs.
3. System Integration & Testing




Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding starting in FYOO through FY02. This Phase
will be used to develop and validate potential technology insertion initiatives that are directly
linked to ORD requirements or to O&S cost savings from a systems perspective. Specific O&S
areas to be incorporated include corrosion prevention, electronics, digital data bus, suspension
and integration of the HMMWV with other components on the Digital Battlefield. ORD
requirements that involve O&S areas include maintainability requirements, maximum
maintenance man-hours per operating hour, and durability. ORD performance upgrades require
the heavier variants to have similar performance and mobility as the current lighter versions.
Towed load allowances are increased. Efforts will be made to create a system that allows more
seamless integration as the highest density vehicle on the digital battlefield to provide a "plug &
play" type adaptable combat platform for various mission critical joint task force systems.
Technologies evaluated during this phase will also be considered from incorporation into the
existing fleet through incorporation in the Recapitalization scope or Modernization Through
Spares initiative to the maximum extent practicable given technical and economic
considerations.
There will be a concerted effort to control acquisition costs by fostering competition.
Prior to initiation of this phase concurrent with the ORD finalization and approval process,
formal market surveys will be conducted to help determine the possibility of system level
competition. The configuration of the modernized HMMWV will be controlled by the
performance specification with the current Technical Data Package (TDP) provided as a
reference document. The market survey will include the draft system performance specification
reflecting the ORD. This is not a new start process. The existing HMMWV will be the baseline
for configuration changes made to meet the specification requirements. While there is informal
information that competitive interest exists there is a significant risk that competition for
HMMWV will not materialize. This risk is compounded by the fact that the POM only supports
the effort required to modernize the existing HMMWV and does not include enough RDT&E
dollars to execute the desired competitive R&D effort among four contractors. In the event that
AM General is the only viable contractor we will enter into a teaming arrangement to maximize
competition at the component level to control costs. We will encourage performance-based
specifications starting at the component level in the SI&T phase. Other program risks in this
phase and also in the production phase are the continued availability of commercial components
that fulfill the system requirements such as the engine. Simulation will be encouraged in
component level selection to minimize test-fix-test iterations. Simulation efforts will be an
integral part of the SI&T phase and will influence the evaluation and selection process for the
production award. Exit criteria for this phase would be the milestone approval for production
where the capability to meet the KPPs of the ORD at an affordable cost is verified.
4. Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support
Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support (PF/DOS) will commence
with exit from the SI&T phase and contingent upon availability of FY02 funding.
HMMWV production will ramp up to a rate sufficient to modernize 100% of Force
Packages 1 and 2 units over a 21 -year period. HMMWV production, combined with the
Recapitalization production quantities will improve the entire fleet over a 21 -year time span and
extend the expected life of the system to a minimum of 21 years. Unfortunately, some
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HMMWVs may be in the field up to 36 years before they are replaced or recapitalized.
Therefore, PM-LTV plans to begin a fleet management program that will include a continuous
evaluation approach. Refer to the Recapitalization section for more discussion.
Operational Support costs will be minimized by encouraging the use of performance-
based specifications. The production product will be proven in limited performance and
durability testing, supplemented by simulation testing. Exit criteria include demonstration of
achievement of KPPs and material release of the production vehicles to the field.
5. Future Plans
It is intended that this process be continued and updated in approximately seven year
cycles and the ORD requirements updated to keep pace with military needs. This strategy allows
for the potential need for a clean sheet approach to obtain the required "leap ahead" technologies
and integration that AAN may require. As the AAN requirements and technology evolve, the
need for a new system emerges, it could begin during any of the seven year iterations of the
Spiral Modernization cycle.
D. Maintain Production
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Efforts to sustain the fleet and the production base until the modernization program goes
into effect will involve the sole source extension of the current production contract. Maintaining
a warm production base is critical to:
• Provide a safety net and contingency plan if the modernized HMMWV production
contract should encounter delays.
• Allow the Army to continue to fill AAO shortages while planning for the future.
• Meet critical interchange to high priority systems.




• Provide vehicles to other services.
• Fill FMS orders.
O&S cost reduction efforts will be continued through this contract. These include
corrosion prevention enhancements and high cost driver improvement changes such as the
Electric Start System (ESS) to reduce glow plug, protective control box, starter and flywheel
consumption. There are no milestone decisions involved with this part of the acquisition.
Assuming that the Modernized HMMWV production effort is progressing on schedule, Army
funding for new HMMWV production, other than interchange customers, will be directed at the
Modernized HMMWV production contract. Production will continue under this contract to





The objective of the Recapitalization program is to extend the life of the over-age
HMMWVs by 21 years while enhancing performance and minimizing O&S costs.
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The phases for Recapitalization occur in an iterative manner: Prototype and Test (PAT)
in FYOO and 10; and Production commences after IPR decisions in FY01, 06, and 1 1 . No other
phases are projected at this time, as the sole focus of this portion (pillar) of the program is the
current HMMWV platform. Recapitalization and new production run concurrently. This section
will detail the first iteration of Prototype and Test (PAT) and Production, which lays the
foundation (baseline) for subsequent iterations.
2. Prototype and Test
RDT&E dollars are provided, commencing in FYOO, to develop and validate through
Developmental Testing potential technology insertion initiatives that are directly linked to O&S
cost savings, as well as improvements in overall vehicle performance. Since this pillar of the
program is recapitalization of a mature design with a proven manufacturing and production
process, much of the risk usually associated with this phase is drastically reduced. This phase
will finalize which new technology initiatives and MWOs will be applied during production of
recapitalized HMMWVs. The exit criterion for this phase is approval of the Recapitalization
portion of the HMMWV Acquisition Strategy, approval to commence production, and approval




initial phase is approximately 18 months. Critical during this phase is the development of
induction criteria that allow flexibility while addressing age, condition (corrosion), mileage,
EUL/Military Useful Life considerations, Maintenance Expenditure Limits (MEL), excessive
O&S costs, and the ability to only repair as necessary proven, reliable components.
3. Recapitalization Production
Procurement dollars commence in FY01 to support this phase. The focus is on producing
a recapitalized HMMWV capable of an additional 21 years service at an acceptable level of O&S
cost. As each production phase runs for a projected length of five years, unanticipated
modifications or upgrades may occur. However, every attempt will be made to minimize this
during the efforts of the preceding phase. After five years, a subsequent production award will
be made, continuing this phase to FY 10. No changes from support provided to the existing fleet
is planned; however, potential for transitioning more functions to a Focused Sustainment
approach does exist, especially for cost reducing/performance enhancing applique initiatives
peculiar to the recapitalized HMMWV. Exit Criteria for this phase are not yet developed.
Concurrently with this phase of the program will be the requirement for close coordination with
new production, focusing on gaining the maximum efficiency and cost savings from linking
these two pillars of the program whenever possible and appropriate. During the latter portion of
this phase, the Exit Criteria for the follow-on iteration of PAT will be developed. Configuration
baseline and system threat assessment will be updated as necessary in conjunction with the
requirement to do so for new production vehicles. Potential actions to dispose of washout
vehicles in a manner that provides additional funding to the HMMWV Program will be
examined. Unserviceable components will be sold as scrap and proceeds used in the
Recapitalization effort. Additionally, flexibility during this phase is critical to adjusting the
model mix of vehicles to meet current requirements.
Criteria will be established for the vehicle users to screen their vehicles during routine
maintenance and identify candidates for induction into the recapitalization program. In addition,
selected vehicles of various years of manufacture and recapitalization will be selected for
comparison testing. The TACOM Fleet Planning Office will also provide PM-LTV with annual
assessments and projections of vehicle condition. The PM-LTV Integrated Data Environment
(IDE) and Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM) interface will be used to assist in
collecting automated information to aid in decision-making.
As a result of this fleet condition and readiness monitoring, the specific model mix,
quantities, and related budget information will be adjusted in the POM as necessary. The
objective is to reduce the peaks and valleys of funding required to ensure adequate readiness,
establish a lower steady state funding stream that can be maintained over time, maintain priority
on Force Packages 1 & 2 requirements, and maintain economic production rates for both
Modernized HMMWV and Recapitalization contracts. This will allow a continuous infusion of
technology into a small quantity of vehicles for our most critical warfighting capability and
ensure readiness of our overall force is maintained at an acceptable level. The strategy for




A. General Philosophy and Approach
This Acquisition Strategy centers on the PM's responsibility for developing a Life Cycle
Management (LCM) approach to Systems Acquisition. As such, this strategy, and its
implementation, will require a focus on light tactical vehicle fleet management.
The AOA forms the basis of this strategy in that it provides an objective assessment of
the six alternatives identified for evaluation by DCSOPS. It concludes that no single HMMWV
variant or other system alternative can meet all of the current or near term mission requirements.
Finally, it provides the detailed life cycle cost data for each alternative on which to construct a
composite alternative that yields the best balance of cost, schedule, performance, risk, and
executability.
The challenge to PM-LTV is to implement this multifaceted strategy in a manner that
achieves an economic balance between new vehicle production, system technological
advancement, and recapitalization. This will be achieved by developing contracts which are: a)
scaleable in scope and/or quantity; b) controllable within available funding levels and cost
objectives; and c) streamlined to allow execution with a minimum of staff and lead time.
Beginning with the approval of the HMMWV JMENS, the program has been classified
and successfully managed as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) III program. The program scope
described within this strategy does not deviate in any significant manner other than to expand the
focus to more effectively address the PM's responsibility for Life Cycle Management. A
decision is required by the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) on the future ACAT
designation of this program.
B. Responsibilities
The government is responsible for:
• Updating the ORD to reflect changes in current and emerging requirements through
the establishment of a Cost/Performance IPT using the CAIV process. Define
requirements in terms of Threshold and Objectives which support technological
growth within the fleet consistent with budgetary constraints.
• Retaining configuration management control and approval authority.
• Developing criteria for inducting fielded HMMWVs into the Recapitalization
program; coordinate the timely movement of fielded assets in support of contract
schedules.
• Management of the HMMWV recapitalization effort will be provided by the Office of
the Project Manager, Light Tactical Vehicles. The project management effort
includes engineering support, logistics and maintenance support planning, reliability
predictions and assessments, configuration management, quality assurance,
procurement and production planning, and cost and schedule management. The PMO





The Contractor(s) is/are responsible for:
• Establishing and using an Integrated Business Environment/Integrated Data
Environments (IBE/IDE) which promote the streamlined business practices needed to
minimize program costs and lead times.
• Maintaining Configuration Management of the HMMWV Technical Data Package to
reflect technological advancements inserted in the fleet.
• Assisting in the development of criteria for selecting HMMWVs for induction into
the recapitalization program.
• Committing to a Government/Industry partnering agreement and fully participate on
IPTs.
• Performing system integration of technology insertions focused on achieving system
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The graph above depicts:
a. The current HMMWV program funding, defined as the POM (through FY05).
b. The Other Procurement-Army (OPA) funding level that would be required to
execute Alternative 2a (Improved HMMWV) of the AOA through FY05.
c. The OPA and RDT&E funding levels required to execute this acquisition
strategy through FY05. The RDT&E funding levels displayed for the period FY98-05 are, in
fact, the current program funding levels, and are minimally sufficient to execute this strategy
during that period. PM-LTV has conducted analysis of historical cost data, analigous cost data
from similar programs, and projections based on our known requirements. PM-LTV concluded
that current RDT&E funding levels are only sufficient to fund a single contractor effort. Having
only one contractor for the development phase locks the program into a sole-source award for
production. Lack of competition for production will potentially increase cost. The OPA funding
levels displayed for the period FY98-05 are also current program funding levels, and are
minimally sufficient to execute this strategy. See Section VI, Risk Assessment for further
details.
20-year LCC, Program Alternatives
















Exc1 Alt 1 Alt 2a Alt 2b Alt 3 Alt 4
HMMWV/ ESP Improved Com Trk Hybrid/ PM Strategy
LMTV/ASV HMMWV HMMWV REMAN Jun 98 Dec 98 Jan 99
The chart above depicts the total program cost (less Military Personnel-Army (MPA)
dollars) required to execute the alternatives considered in the AOA. Note that the AOA
concluded that only Alternative 2A (Improved HMMWV), Alternative 4 - June 1998 PM
Strategy (Improved HMMWV with Hybrid Remanufacturing), Alternative 4 - December 1 998
PM Strategy (Improved HMMWV with Recapitalization), and Alternative 4 - January 1999
(Improved HMMWV with Recapitalization at 60% cost of Improved HMMWV, which is







Government staffing will be maintained at the minimum level consistent with effective
program oversight and control of program cost, schedule and performance. Current PM-LTV
staffing is presented below. It is expected that as this and other programs under the purview of





















As an alternative to hiring DA civilians to augment the PMO staff, maximum use will be
made of technical support contracts.
D. Internal Controls
Effective controls will be established and maintained using DoD 5000.2-R, Part 3.3.5.1
as a guide.
E. Tailoring and Streamlining
1
.
Requests for Relief/Exception from Requirements
• Authority will be requested to dispose of non-economically repairable assets through
the recapitalization contract for salvage value as an offset to the contract costs.
• Request authority for "like kind" exchange to sell serviceable assets and return funds
to the program to finance new assets.
2. Other Tailoring or Streamlining Plans
• Maximum use will be made of requirements contracts for new vehicle production,
recapitalization, and Technical Insertion materials as a means of maintaining
flexibility in the program.
• Maximum use of acquisition streamlining initiatives and other innovative approaches




• Incentives will be employed as a means of encouraging the contractor to seek
continuous process improvements that will result in reductions to the total cost of
ownership. Metrics will be established and reported quarterly to track progress.




Earned Value Management techniques will be utilized during the Recapitalization and
Modernization developmental efforts to minimize program costs, maximize the quality of the
development efforts, and protect program schedules.
2. Establishing Cost Objectives
• A revised HMMWV Life Cycle Cost Program Office Estimate (POE) will be
establish leveraging the AOA cost analysis data.
• CAIV processes will be utilized to establish cost thresholds for critical program
elements.
3. Managing Tradeoffs
• A Cost/Performance IPT will be established with total participation of the PMO
and the user community in revising the HMMWV ORD by conducting
cost/benefit analyses and applying CAIV principle as a means of establishing
realistic thresholds and objectives within the requirements document.
• Emerging technologies, identified through independent programs such as
COMBATT or R&D initiatives supported within this strategy, will be evaluated
for their cost and potential for eliminating O&S cost drivers or achieving
performance objectives as defined in the ORD.
4. Government Role in Managing/Approving Tradeoffs
• Design reviews will be required as a part of the System Integration and Test of the
Modernized HMMWV.
• Metrics and thresholds will be established.
• All threshold breaches will require PM approval prior to IPT implementation.





Risk is an undesirable situation or circumstance which has both a probability of occurring
and a potential consequence to program success; risks are normally associated with uncertainties.
Risk management is an organized, systematic decision-making process that efficiently identifies
risks, assessor analyzes risks, and effectively reduces or eliminates risks to achieving program
goals.
Risk management applies to all organizational levels and includes decision makers,
program managers, and functional area experts. Risk management is necessary to deliver quality
materiel to the customer in a timely manner at a reasonable price. Risk management is an
integral part of program and functional area management throughout the program life cycle and
should be thought of as an evolutionary and continuous process. Government and industry both
require program planning to manage risk in decision-making and the application of resources.
The program planning and risk management processes are tailored to support the milestone
decision review of the system being acquired.
A. PM-LTV Risk Management Process
PM-LTV will maintain a risk management program through the entire life cycle of the
HMMWV to identify and mitigate performance, cost, and schedule risks. The risk management
program shall identify and track risk drivers, define risk abatement plans, and provide for
continuous risk assessment throughout each acquisition phase to determine how risks have
changed. Risk reduction measures will be included in cost-performance trade-offs, where
applicable. The risk management program will plan for back-ups in risk areas and identify
design requirements where performance increase is small relative to cost, schedule, and
performance risk. The acquisition strategy will include identification of the risk areas of the
HMMWV program and a discussion of how the PM intends to manage those risks. The figure
below describes the approach PM-LTV will follow in risk management. Following it are
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• Transition to production checklists
• Test failures












• Identify the risk level from the 5X5 risk grid below
Risk Planning - How Can You Reduce the Risk?
• Avoid by eliminating the risk cause and/or consequence
• Control the cause or consequence
• Transfer the risk
• Assume the risk level and continue on current plan
• ... and more
Risk Tracking - How Are Things Going?
• Communicate risks to all affected parties
• Monitor risk plans




B. Program Risk Analysis Methodology
Program risk analysis assesses the degree of risk associated with a program event or
situation. Early identification of program risk, along with an objective analysis of the likelihood
of the occurrence and magnitude of the impact will ensure that the LTV project office is prepared
to respond in the best interests of the Army as risks develop. The tables below describes the




What is the Likelihood the Risk Will Happen?
Level Your Approach and Processes:
1 Not Likely Will effectively avoid or mitigate this risk
based on standard practices.
2 Low
Likelihood
Have usually mitigated this type of risk
with minimal oversight in similar cases.








Cannot mitigate this type of risk; no















2 3 4 5
™^^^ Consequence
Given the risk is realized, what would be the magnitude of the impact?
Level Technical Schedule Cost
1 Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact
2 Minor perf. Shortfall,
same approach retained
Additional activities
required; able to meet
key dates
Budget increase or unit
production cost increase <1%
3 Mod. perf. Shortfall, but
workarounds available
Minor schedule slip;
will miss need date
Budget increase or unit























To successfully optimize this strategy, additional funding may be required. If additional funding
is not provided, the contract strategy includes plans to reduce the number of developmental
contracts awarded consistent with the funding available. If the program is unable to create
competition in the current sole-source environment, the scope of industry input will be seriously
reduced in developing cost effective technical solutions and will potentially increase the cost.
The Army is committed to supporting the strategy and finding additional funds within the Army.
In order to mitigate the risk of increased cost given current RDT&E funding levels, PM-
LTV will increase the partnering efforts with AM General. Through the partnering approach,
innovative thinking, use of IPTs, and other key enablers, we will minimize the costs of the sole
source situation. Also, flexibility is built into this strategy, such that, if competition is not
possible in the first cycle, there are opportunities built into the Spiral Modernization strategy to
re-introduce competition.
b. Procurement Funding
If this strategy is executed at the Extended Program Plan (EPP) levels, a) 78% of the fleet
will be overage in FY 10, b) it will take over 50 years to replace the fleet, c) O&S costs will rise,
and d) Modernization and Recapitalization production will run at less than economic rates,
resulting in increased costs. Therefore, adjustments to the EPP will be included in the next POM
cycle submission.
2. Competition
Based on the lack of competition the HMMWV has received in the past, with projected
future quantities less than what the Army procured historically, there is a risk of not receiving
competition of future requirements, especially with other contractors competing against the
incumbent vehicle manufacturer. A sole source contract with the incumbent HMMWV
manufacturer may increase the risk of gaining a reasonable vehicle price. Competition in itself
helps keep a contractors proposed price in line with other offerors. A sole source contractor may
not be so constrained.
3 Seven Year Contract
Utilizing a seven-year contract (5-year multi-year plus two additional option years of
production) leaves the funding in the Army budget for the option years vulnerable for reductions.
The funding for the multi-year program years is protected by the additional costs the Army
would incur in paying cancellation fees for termination.
4. Recapitalization Program Control




reviews will be held with the contractor and other supporting activities to ensure that program
progress is being accomplished in an efficient and effective manner. As a minimum, Production
Progress Reports will be required. These reports will be used in coordination with the cognizant
Contract Administration Office to monitor contractor effort and progress under the contract.
Performance and cost data will be requested to the extent necessary.
5. Availability of Commercial Components
There is risk in the continued availability of commercial components such as the engine.
In order to manage program risk in this area, we will work closely with the component suppliers
to accurately forecast and procure sufficient engine quantities to support future vehicle
production until the end of the current contract. Environmental waivers for the engine must be
obtained but informal contact with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) indicates that a
relatively short term waiver could be obtained.
6. Modernized HMMWV Production Lead Time
There is risk associated with the length of time it will take to start producing Modernized
HMMWVs after the production award, particularly if a new contractor is selected. Based on
historical data, the average time from production contact award to delivery for trucks, for
contractors who have not produced the product, is four years. This risk will be mitigated by
establishing options on the existing contract to allow continuation of production until the





All HMMWV program alternatives will be supported using the current logistics and
maintenance structure established for Army wheeled vehicles using the existing four level Army
Maintenance System with repair parts available through the established supply system. Interim
Contractor Logistics Support (ICLS) is envisioned in order to support Authorized Support List
(ASL) requirements until appropriate standard supply levels are built. This is estimated to occur
no later than the end of the first multi-year production contract. Contractor Depot Level Support
(CDLS) is not envisioned. Details for transition from ICLS to organic support will be provided
as part of the Logistic Support Plans.
The HMMWV program will also explore alternative strategies, such as, use of Electronic
Commerce (EC)/Direct Vendor delivery (DVD) for new and unique items that are introduced by
the HMMWV FOV. This approach will be subject to cost and benefit analysis to document
whether O&S savings are possible, as well as, that the retail/wholesale, stockage-based logistic
system could be augmented by a more responsive direct distribution system that meets the user's
needs, including wartime mission and deployment. This analysis will be ongoing with
preliminary results expected in mid 1999. Included with the EC/DVD concept will be use of a
return for credit or return for repair to the DVD contractor as an option to the user. This is
intended to improve flexibility in managing scarce maintenance resources as well as offering
possible means of improving turn around time to repair by contractually requiring specified
delivery or turn around days based on priority. In any case, the intent to use EC/DVD logistic
support would also be based upon making the EC/DVD logistic support approach seamless from






























The HMMWV logistics approach will also maximize the use of digital tools to aid in the
maintaining of the system. IETMs will be fielded with the end item. The IETM will include a
Computer Based Inter-active Training System (CBITS) section enabling the maintainer to
familiarize or refresh themselves with theory and operation of components of the system. The
IETM will also include an interface with the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) and/or the
global Combat Support System (ARMY) for automated parts requisitioning. The IETM will
interface through the HMMWV databus to vehicle sensors to isolate faults and guide the
maintainer through the diagnostic process. The IETM will link troubleshooting steps, repair
tasks, and repair parts information, including follow-up troubleshooting to ensure that all faults
are addressed and complete repair has been accomplished. The goal of the IETM is to shorten
down time, reduce maintenance man-hours, reduce "No Evidence of Failure (NEOF) rates,
improve readiness and expedite parts ordering while reducing errors in the requisitioning
process. The use of available technology to improve diagnostics will reduce support costs for the
weapon system. This, coupled with identifying O&S cost drivers, and examining diagnostics
systems that will improve capability through increased accuracy, reduced diagnostics time,
eliminating or reducing parts stockage, is part of the overall strategy to reduce O&S costs.
As an inherent part of our business we will utilize a continuous process that will
determine the O&S cost drivers, provide for a cognitive technical review and recommend
changes or alternatives that will lower operating and support costs throughout the life cycle of
the equipment. These changes can be accomplished through the introduction of new materials,
technology design or fabrication processes. Identification of cost drivers that impact O&S cost is
through the data bases that support wholesale and retail maintenance management such as the






VIII. Business and Contracting Strategy
A. Modernize and Maintain Production
The High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family of vehicles has
been solely produced by AM General Corporation, South Bend, Indiana, since 1985. The
HMMWV Up-Armored vehicle model is produced by two manufacturer's. The vehicle chassis
is manufactured by AM General Corporation, which is then provided as Government Furnished
Material to O'Gara-Hess & Eisenhardt Armoring Company (OHE), Fairfield, Ohio, who then
armors the chassis and delivers the end product. OHE has been sole producer of the Up-
Armored vehicle.
1 . Procurement Competition and Contracting Strategy
The HMMWV was first procured through the use of a performance specification. Three
contractors each designed and delivered eleven prototype vehicles for Government test and
evaluation. As a result of a formal source selection process, AM General was selected as the
winner of the production effort, and contract award was made in March 1983 to acquire 49,808
vehicles with 100% option on a five-year multi-year basis.
The first rebuy acquisition was solicited, using a level III Technical Data Package (TDP),
on a limited competition basis under a Two-Step Invitation for Bids (IFB). AM General
submitted the sole technical bid under Step One of the IFB and, as a result, the acquisition was
then continued with a Request for Proposal (RFP) issued sole source to AM General. In August
1989, a five-year multi-year contract was awarded to AM General Corporation to acquire 33,331
vehicles with 100% option. A two-year STS level of effort was included in this contract award.
The U.S. Marine Corps and the Army had a joint program agreement for this rebuy contract, in
which the U.S. Marine Corps participated in the program year funding/quantities of the fourth
and fifth program years.
The second rebuy acquisition was executed in two contractual phases. A sole source
letter contract was awarded to AM General in December 1994 to acquire 1,201 HMMWVs for
the Army. This contract served as a production bridge while a HMMWV requirements contract
was being negotiated sole source with AM General. In December 1995, a five-year
requirements contract was awarded, based on a level III TDP. The requirements contract has an
estimated maximum quantity of 13,800 vehicles. To date, a total of 9,481 vehicles have been
acquired. The contract, valid through October 2000, will be extended through FY03 to continue
to fill AAO requirements for Army interchange customers, USMC, U.S. Air Force, and FMS.
The PM plans on issuing a formal market survey with an attached draft system
performance specification in Apr 99, soliciting for interest, comments, and program
recommendations. Up to four two year Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contracts will be awarded
in FY00 for systems integration and testing of vehicles against the ORD requirements. This
strategy will potentially inspire other truck manufacturers to become competitive prior to the
FY02 down select and production award. The modernized HMMWV vehicle program will be




reference only. The modernized HMMWV production contract will be awarded in FY02. Based
on the historical lack of competition received for the previously solicited HMMWV
procurements, there exists a moderate risk of not getting any offerors other than AM General for
the HMMWV. However, the COMBATT dual use demonstration program includes three
commercial vehicle contractors, each of whom may have a continued interest in pursuing a
competitive production contract with the Army
The contracting strategy for the procurement of HMMWVs is broken down into a near
term approach and an out year approach, as outlined below. The attached milestone chart lays
out the procurement major event time lines for both of the contracting approaches.
The PM intends to continue the procurement of the currently configured HMMWVs from
AM General Corporation, through FY03, on a sole source basis under the current requirements
contract. The additional effort under this contract will require sole source approval to add in an
additional two years of production, possible increase in the maximum estimated quantity, and
probable unit price re-negotiations. Vehicles will be procured to a technical data package with
negotiated firm fixed prices. It is planned that the vehicles acquired under this contract,
produced at the contractually negotiated production rate of 10 vehicles per day (approximately
2,350 per year) will run production through FY03, satisfying Army requirements while acting as
a bridge to the next production contract for modernized HMMWVs.
The PM plans acquiring the modernized HMMWV vehicles, starting in FY00, using a
two-phased procurement approach. The first phase will be a competitive development contract,
funded with RDT&E funding, for system integration and testing of technical insertions and
vehicle modernization. The development phase will be solicited using a system performance
specification based on the new ORD. A cost-plus-incentive-fee type of contract is planned for
this effort. Depending upon funding availability, contract awards, based on a paper down-select,
will be made to up to four contractors who will deliver up to a maximum of six vehicle models
for testing run-off. The contractors will also be required to deliver a performance-based
specification with supporting documentation, which will be utilized in the phase two production
contract. The PM anticipates several domestic as well as foreign truck manufacturers will
compete for these developmental contracts. Best value, source selection procedures will be
utilized in the selection of the development contract winners.
The second phase of the procurement approach is production contract award. Best value,
source selection evaluation procedures will be utilized to down select from the four developmental
contracts to a single production contract winner. The type of contract planned for production is a
firm fixed price, five-year multi-year contract with an two additional production option years, plus
100% option against the total multi-year quantity. Quantities estimated by year are found on the
HMMWV Fleet Program Outline chart in Section IV. A., Program Status. The PM plans to include
in the production contract provisions for only newly identified, initial/spare parts Contractor
Logistics Support (CLS), with an incentive clause for timely delivery and maintaining a high
readiness rate. The contractor will be required to provide, as a deliverable, a performance based
specification with supporting documentation which enhances the vehicle drawing package, that is
suitable for competitive procurement. These will be used to competitively acquire vehicle




The PM plans to procure HMMWVs in seven year cycles, through FY23, repeating the
two-phased competitive contracting approach discussed above for each cycle. The
developmental phases will leverage the latest advances in technology found in both the
government and private sectors. Each procurement will be acquired using performance based
specifications with supporting documentation that enhances the HMMWV drawing package.
2. Joint Requirements
The U.S. Marine Corps has been and continues to be partners with the U.S. Army in the
procurement of HMMWVs. The U.S. Marine Corps plans to acquire new HMMWV vehicles, to
replace their fleet, in concert with the Army's acquisition strategy. The services will enter a joint
mission requirement, with a signed Memorandum of Agreement, which will tie the U.S. Marine
Corps funding in with Army funding. The Army and the U.S. Marine Corps will combine
requirements to mutually determine and fund program quantities for both the currently
configured HMMWV under the requirements contract as well as the multi-year competitive
procurement. The U.S. Marine Corps funding started in FY98 and continues out to
approximately 2005, with a total overall requirement of about 18,000 HMMWVs.
Other DOD services, Government agencies, and Foreign Military Sales have provided
funding to the Army for procurement of their HMMWV requirements. The following quantities
of HMMWVs have been acquired for various customers from the start of the HMMWV program
back in 1983 to date:
Other Army: 2,200
U.S. Marine Corps 18,582
U.S. Navy 585
U.S. Air Force 3,790
Foreign Military Sales 9,769
The PM anticipates receiving the approximately the same number of customer HMMWV
requirements identified above over the next decade, due to the age of the fleet.
3. Acquisition Streamlining
The Army plans on utilizing as many streamlining initiatives as necessary to meet overall
program requirements. The planned market survey will be electronically issued, as well as the
competitive R&D solicitation. Alpha contracting will be used to negotiate both the current
HMMWV program additional effort as well as the future HMMWV production contract. The
PM anticipates executing a formal partnering agreement with the winner of the future production
contract. Specifications and standards will be used minimally in all solicitations, with waivers
sought when required. Offerors will be encouraged to utilize, to the maximum extent possible,
Single Process Initiatives (SPI) in the manufacturing of its vehicle. The PM has already formed
an Integrated Process/Product Team (IPPT) to collectively plan and execute the program
strategies, and will continue to use the IPPT throughout the life of the program. CAIV will be
applied by the IPPT throughout the program. A Cost Performance IPT has also been established





The PM-LTV IBE, enabled by the IDE, will be used to encourage creativity and reduce
overall costs in meeting the user requirements. Refer to Section IX, Other Important
Considerations, for additional information.
B. Recapitalize
1. Industry Involvement in the Program to Date
An initial market survey was issued 25 November 1996 that requested industry comment
to an effort that would combine remanufacturing as well as new production vehicles that would
replace the HMMWV. In response to this survey, which was mailed to over 200 companies and
synopsized in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD), twenty written responses were received. Of
these twenty, eight were potential prime contractors and twelve potential component suppliers.
Because of a significant change in program definition (no longer pursuing new production
vehicles, but including STS and ICLS, a second market survey was issued 1 1 September 1997,
with over 170 hard copies mailed, and notice published in the CBD. In addition, the survey and
draft system specification was published on the PM-LTV web site at www.pmltv.com to
generate maximum interest. As a result of this second survey, a total of seventeen responses
were received. Of the seventeen, ten stated they were interested and responded to the survey
questions. The program has now evolved from Remanufacturing to Recapitalization and will no
longer include STS. An Industry Day is planned which will afford potential contractors the
opportunity to provide additional input prior to release of the Recapitalization solicitation in
FY99. In FY00, three eighteen-month development contracts will be competitively awarded to
solicit recapitalization concepts from industry and to produce prototypes against the HMMWV
TDP with performance enhancements such as 21 year corrosion protection.
2. Competition.
Results of the earlier market surveys indicate that there are numerous sources (including
foreign and domestic manufacturers, depots and the National Guard) interested in this
recapitalization effort. The solicitation for the development contract will be issued on a full and
open competition basis with no restrictions. One follow-on production contract, with limited
competition, will be awarded based upon the results of test and evaluation of the vehicle
prototypes and production proposal evaluation.
3. Contracting Strategy
a. Major Contracts Planned.
Contracts will be awarded in two phases. The first phase will be a development contract
for Prototype and Test (PAT) utilizing RDT&E funds. The second phase will be the production
contract. In the development phase, contractor-proposed Scopes Of Work (SOW) will be
evaluated and, as a result of the best value source selection process, three contracts will be
awarded. During development, each of the three contractors will build six prototypes, which will
be subjected to contractor and Government testing in order to thoroughly evaluate each
contractor's proposed design. Upon completion of PAT, the second phase for production will
commence. The results of PAT, along with contractor production proposals, will be evaluated





production contract will be awarded. Requirements for follow-on recapitalization contracts will
be evaluated individually and determinations made based on targeted quantities and conditions
existing at the time. Estimated quantities, by year, are shown on the HMMWV Fleet Program
Outline chart shown in Section IV.A., Program Status.
b. Contract Structure.
1) Basic Contract.
It is planned to solicit proposals using a Statement of Objectives (SOO) in lieu of a SOW.
The SOO specifies the Government's top level, overall objectives of the effort and will include
the HMMWV TDP for reference. In response, the contractor prepares the SOW containing the
details and submits it along with his proposal for evaluation. Use of a SOO provides offerors
maximum flexibility in developing cost-effective solutions and in proposing innovative
alternatives to meet the Government's objectives. The PAT/development phase is planned as an
eighteen-month effort. For the production phase, a five-year requirements contract is planned
rather than a multiyear to provide flexibility in adjusting the specific quantities. The quantities to
undergo recapitalization will be affected by the actual condition of the vehicles to be inducted
into the program and the washout criteria to be established. The initial contract will be awarded
in 2QFY00, with the production contract being awarded in FY01. Subsequent awards for
follow-on contracts are planned in order to sustain continuous production. The PM plans to time
the future Recapitalization contracts to follow on the heels of the modernized HMMWV contract
in order to leverage the technology insertion opportunities that result from that effort.
2) Options
The production effort will include an option to procure an update to the HMMWV
performance-based specification, along with supporting documentation. Also included, in both
phases, will be an option for Field Service Representative (FSR) support.
c. Contract Type
The recapitalization development contract will be awarded as a CPIF-type of contract.
The production effort will be awarded using FFP.
d. Incentives
The use of FFP is considered to be the most beneficial because it places maximum risk
and responsibility on the contractor for all costs and his resulting profit/loss. It also provides the
maximum incentive for the contractor to control his costs in this area and perform effectively and
efficiently. It is also planned to include vehicle performance incentives to encourage the
contractor to build a reliable and high quality product. The performance incentive will be based
upon results of regularly scheduled Government-run and Government-scored comparison testing
which will be conducted on randomly selected vehicles.
e. Special Contract Terms and Conditions






Breakout will not be employed in the traditional sense, in order that responsibility and
risk for material delivery and conformance is retained by the contractor. However, analysis will
be conducted to assess the cost benefit to the government from consolidating the procurement of
selected components required under both the Modernization and Recapitalization production
efforts. Where analysis demonstrates sufficient cost benefit, clauses will be exercised under the
Modernization contract to procure and deliver those selected components to the Recapitalization
contractor.
5. Acquisition Streamlining.
Only the minimum essential requirements will be included in the solicitation and
resulting contract for recapitalization. The functional templates provided for guidance will be
used by the HMMWV Recapitalization IPT members and requirements tailored for this specific
action. Since the solicitation will be issued utilizing the SOO approach, requirements will be
stated at the top level, with the contractor providing the details of its approach in its proposed
SOW. Therefore, it is not the Government's intent to specify performance in accordance with
any military specifications or standards. Electronic delivery of data items will be mandatory.
After contract award, Government and contractor personnel will receive partnering training, and




EX. Other Important Considerations
A. Integrated Data Environment/Integrated Business Environment
Success in implementing this strategy is contingent on the PM's ability to communicate
and coordinate, in real time, with user and industry partners. The breath and complexity of this
program demands the ability to acquire and analyze a variety of data, process that data to form or
update programmatic decisions, and implement actions which properly influence the execution
of the program objectives. Given these realities, the PM has developed a Government Concept
of Operations (GCO), and is aggressively implementing steps to establish the IDE/IBE.
B. Dual Use Technology
The application of dual use technologies is central to this strategy. From its inception,
the HMMWV design has made significant use of commercial technologies as a means of
reducing design, manufacturing, and ownership costs. This strategy has been structured to build
on that philosophy and advance the use of commercial technologies.
Commercially available systems must be identified, evaluated, and integrated into the
HMMWV design to replace those commercial items used in the current design which, owing to
changes in the commercial market, will no longer be available to support the existing fleet and
current production.
Commercial technologies will be identified, evaluated, and integrated into the HMMWV
design where analysis indicates system performance enhancement can be achieved cost
effectively or O&S costs can be reduced. Where technologies are proven to be cost effective,
they will be incorporated in vehicle production programs and in the fleet through Modernization
Through Spares and field mod initiatives.
The COMBATT program, which will be leveraged to support HMMWV modernization
and recapitalization efforts, is by design focusing on the adaptation of current and emerging
commercial truck technology to military applications.
Both the HMMWV Modernization and Recapitalization development contract
requirements will be defined utilizing performance specification which will maximize the
contractor flexibility to respond with solutions based on commercial designs.
C. Environmental Issues
In July 1989 the Project Manager for Light Tactical Vehicles approved the HMMWV
Life Cycle Environmental Assessment. This assessed the environmental impacts of the basic
HMMWV on air quality, noise, and soil; and the impact of the production facility, disposal,
related hazardous materials, and other impacts on the environment. Following is a summary of
the July 1989 Environmental Assessment for the HMMWV:
1 . Vehicle Impact on Air Quality




year of manufacture of the rebuy program. During initial HMMWV production, 1984 through
1987, the 6.2 liter diesel engine conformed to EPA emission standards. In 1988, however, EPA
allowable emission levels were changed to incorporate particulates, a previously unregulated
exhaust component. While the engine fully met HC, CO and NOx by several fold, engine
particulate emissions exceeded the new 1988 particulate standard by 0.16 gm/Bhp-hr. Upon the
request from TACOM, EPA granted a National Security Exemption (NSE) for engines produced
from 1988 through 1990. During the rebuy contract which began in 1990, the engine complied
with all EPA emission requirements in effect for 1990, including particulates. The HMMWV
emits odors caused by diesel fuel combustion; however, the overall impact of combustion odor is
minimal. Except as discussed above, the HMMWV has complied with the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the overall impact of the vehicle on air quality is rated Not Significant.
2. Vehicle Impact on Noise
The HMMWV system specification requires interior noise levels to conform to MIL-
STD-1474 where steady state noise levels are required to be less than 85 dBA. Continuous
exposure to noise levels in excess of 85 dBA maybe hazardous. (TB MED 501, 15 Mar 1980).
During testing, the HMMWV has conformed to MIL-STD-1474 except for the passenger
positions on a few models which are discussed below. The Health Hazard Assessment Report
for HMMWV Group II identifies the worst case exposure to noise under the expected use
scenario to be 50 minutes at 86 dBA for ambulances and 45 minutes at 89 dBA (75 mile mission)
for shelter carriers. While these noise levels are above the continuous 85 dBA hearing protection
threshold, they are not considered hazardous to hearing because of the limited time exposure.
Since these variants are the worst case for the HMMWV, the overall impact of the vehicle on
noise levels is rated Not Significant.
3. Production Facility Impact on Environment
The Contractor is bound by contract clauses identifying Federal Acquisition Regulations
(48 CFR Chapters 1 & 2) which require compliance and certification to Environmental Laws.
They include but are not limited to; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the
Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 USC 1251, et seq) (1976), and the Clean Air Act, as amended (42
USC 7401, et seq.) (1979 Supp.). The Contractor's production facility is operated in compliance
with Federal, State and local air, water, and solid waste regulations. The overall impact of the
production facility is rated Not Significant.
4. Disposal Phase
Vehicles will be disposed of in accordance with standard property disposal procedures
associated with military vehicles. Special disposal facilities will not be required. TACOM will
maintain a maximum dollar value for repairs, which decreases throughout the life cycle of the
vehicle. When the vehicle repair estimate exceeds the maximum value, TACOM issues a list of
parts to be cannibalized and re-utilized from the vehicle. All parts are redistributed within the
Department of Defense or sold for reuse or scrap by the local Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Service Office. The overall impact of vehicle disposal is rated Not Significant.
5. Impacts of Related Hazardous Materials (HazMat)




6. Impacts on Soil
The HMMWV will impact soil in the same manner as other on/off road vehicles.
Vehicles will use paved surfaces when available. Fluids and lubricants used in the HMMWV are
basic automotive type: engine oil, differential gear lube, transmission fluid for both primary
transmission and transfer transmission; silicone brake fluid, automotive antifreeze, and diesel
fuel. In addition to the manufacturer's recommended commercial fuels, vehicles will be operated
on fuels conforming to VV-F-800, MIL-T-5624, MIL-F-46162, and MIL-T-83133. Lubricants
conforming to MIL-L-2104, MIL-L-2105, MIL-L-46167, and MIL-G-10924 shall also be used.
These fluids will penetrate soil when accidents or seal/equipment failures occur. The overall
impact on soil is rated Not Significant.
7. Other Environmental Impacts
There are no significant biological or cultural impacts anticipated as a result of the
HMMWV program. Socioeconomic effects include payroll to support production, and various
sub-contractors. The impact on public utilities from the HMMWV program will be minimal.
Power requirements should not exceed earlier production levels. The overall impact on other
environmental factors is rated Not Significant.
In 1994 the HMMWV project office conducted an extensive review of contractual
documents to determine the extent of use of Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODC). This review
was required by Section 326 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.
The review determined that six specifications or standards were affected by the requirement. Of
those six, only the requirement to eliminate Freon as a refrigerant in the M997 4-litter ambulance
air conditioning system was determined to not be economically feasible. At the time of the
determination, only 39 ambulances remained on contract to be built. An economic analysis
determined that it would be more cost-effective to retrofit all ambulances to use HFC- 134a
refrigerant rather than halt production of the remaining ambulances until engineering work was
completed to introduce the new refrigerant into production.
In June 1996 the Environmental Assessment was updated with a Record of
Environmental Consideration to cover production of the HMMWV A2 series and the Expanded
Capacity Vehicle (ECV). These vehicles included a new 6.5 liter naturally aspirated engine and
a catalytic converter to meet Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emission standards in
effect for 1995. The XM1 1 14 Up-Armored ECV has a turbocharged 6.5 liter engine and also has
an air conditioning unit that does not use an ODC.
D. Safety
The HMMWV was designed to ensure functionality, ease, and safety of operation for all
functions performed by operational and maintenance personnel based on 5th percentile female
through 95th percentile male soldiers. Safety factors in the designs and specifications were
dictated by the following:






The 1983 specification for initial HMMWV production had the following requirement:
"Exposed components and systems which are subject to high
temperatures, high pressures, electrically actuated, or inherently
hazardous, shall be provided with correct safeguarding and insulating
features. Suitable roll over protection for the crew shall be provided
which shall be consistent with vehicle application, i.e., high speed off-road
usage. Vehicle shall comply with all applicable requirements in M1L-
STD-1180for Type 1 vehicles. "4
The HMMWV A2 series specification describes the safety provisions in more detail, as
shown below: 5 A2 series HMMWVs shall comply with the requirements of MIL-STD-1 180 for
Type I vehicles and FMVSS Requirement 216 except as follows:
• Requirement 208, Seat belt warning system is not required.
• Requirement 101, Control illumination shall be as provided for in the TDP.
• Requirement 108, Identification lights shall be as identified in the TDP.
• Requirement 108, Convoy warning light receptacles are not required.
• Requirement 108, Blackout driving light provisions shall be as provided for in the
TDP.
• Requirement 111, Inside rearview mirrors are not required.
• Requirement 108, Back-up lamp requirements are only applicable to the M997 A2
Ambulance.
• Requirement 201, Occupant protection shall be as provided in the TDP.
• Requirement 204, Steering control rearward displacement is not applicable.
• Requirement 208, Vehicle crash tests will not be required, however, current
performance levels shall not be degraded in the event a change to current vehicle
configurations is required.
• Requirement 219, Windshield zone intrusion is not applicable, however, current
performance levels shall not be degraded in the event a change to current vehicle
configurations is required.
• Requirement 216, Roof crush resistance requirements are not applicable to the M997
A2 ambulance model, however, current performance levels shall not be degraded in
the event a change to the current vehicle configuration is required.
Efforts are underway to improve the crew restraint systems and protection of the crew
during rollovers. Any fleet-wide changes to improve crew safety in the HMMWV are done
US Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, System Specification for HMMWV, 3 February 1983,
paragraph 3.3.5.






under the assumption that users will not modify the vehicle's configuration. In practice,
however, users regularly modify the configuration, for example by adding communications

























































Cost As an Independent Variable
Commerce Business Daily
Computer Based Interactive Training System
Contractor Depot Logistics Support
Cost and Economic Analysis Center
Code of Federal Regulations
Contractor Logistics Support
Commercially Based Tactical Truck
Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Crew Protection Kit
Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle
Department of the Army
Defense Acquisition Executive
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Deputy Project Manager
Deputy for Systems Acquisition























Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation
Foreign Military Sales
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
Family of Vehicles
Field Service Representative






High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
High Mobility Trailer













Interim Contractor Logistics Support
Interactive Electronic Technical Manual
Invitation For Bid
Integrated Logistics Support
Integrated Product and Process Team
In Process Review
Integrated Process Team
Inspect and Repair Only As Necessary
JMENS Joint Mission Element Needs Statement





Light Medium Tactical Vehicle
Light Tactical Vehicles






























Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
Ozone Depleting Chemicals
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Other Procurement Army
Operational Requirements Document
Operating and Support Cost Reduction









Production, Fielding/Deployment, Operations and Support
Project Management Office
Project Manager








Research, Development and Acquisition






















Tank-automotive and Armaments Command
Table of Distribution and Allowances
Technical Data Package
Table of Organization & Equipment
TRADOC Analysis Center - Fort Lee, VA
Training and Doctrine Command
TRADOC System Manager





Unit Level Logistics System
United States Air Force
United States Code
United States Marine Corps
WOLF
WSMR
Work Order Logistics File
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Description ofHMMWV AOA Alternatives
Alternative 1
EXTENDED SERVICE PROGRAM
Scope : This alternative conducts an Extended Service Program (ESP) to extend the life of
existing, aging HMMWVs to "Age 0" through a combination of refurbishment, component
replacements, and addition of the latest technology where appropriate. It is part of the PM-LTV
Life Cycle Management strategy to recapitalize the HMMWV fleet by using available funds to
preserve and enhance past investments.
General Description : The objectives of this program are to extend the useful service life of, and
provide operational and safety improvements to, the oldest vehicles in the HMMWV fleet. For
the AOA, these vehicles will have the "A3" model designation. This designation applies only to
the AOA and does not affect any HMMWV model designations which are part of the LTV Life
Cycle Management (LCM) acquisition strategy. For performance and cost modelling, this
alternative will be represented by the M998A3. This will be achieved by a combination of
component refurbishment and replacement. Selected components which have been improved
during the evolution of the HMMWV will be incorporated in the vehicles where technically and
economically feasible. The program would include improvements to make the vehicles more
resistant to the effects of corrosive environments. This alternative is based on a previously
funded program to remanufacture HMMWVs as a bridge until a "next generation" HMMWV is
developed. The program envisioned a nearly one for one ratio of vehicles inducted to vehicles
produced. See the attached Vehicle Comparison Matrix for ratings of this alternative against the
ORD requirements.
Vehicle Requirements:
The HMMWV ESP will produce vehicles of all variants which are in the current
HMMWV fleet. They will operate on JP8 fuel; be capable of being towed, performing self-
recovery, recovering equivalent vehicles and will mount a tow pintle for towing designated
trailers. These vehicles shall be capable of operating under on-road/off-road conditions and must
withstand equivalent strain, shock, vibration and other detrimental conditions incident to off-road
travel and operation as the original HMMWVs. The vehicles shall be capable of meeting all
performance characteristics under a typical life cycle mileage profile consisting of 30% primary
roads, 30% secondary roads, and 40% cross country operations, while carrying and towing
specified loads. Vehicles will have the following performance characteristics equivalent to the
HMMWV: mobility; tires; operating temperatures; emissions; payloads; transportability
characteristics; communications equipment. 6
Vehicles shall be disassembled, inspected and their usable components cleaned and/or
refurbished. Parts that are not economical to repair shall be replaced with new parts in
accordance with the applicable technical data package. All components normally replaced based
6 HMMWV Remanufacture Program Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) (Draft). Section III.A.
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on wear or at regular intervals (time or mileage) as specified in the applicable technical manual
shall be replaced regardless of condition. Vehicles with new engines shall comply with
Environmental Protection Agency regulations governing control of air pollution from New
Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines in effect on the date of contract award.
Vehicles with remanufactured or IROANed engines shall comply with the regulations applicable
at the time of engine manufacture.7
Some of the major components, modifications, and upgrades are as follows: 8
De-tuned 6.5L V8 Engine
Rebuilt or IROAN 3 speed Automatic Transmission
New Radiator with Improved Heat Rejection
Improved Corrosion Resistant Exhaust System
Higher Air Flow Air Cleaner Element
Dual Voltage 100 Amp Alternator (replaces 60 amp alternator)
West Coast Style Mirrors
A2 Style Bucket Seats
3-Point Seat Belts
Higher Capacity, 3 1/2 Ton Jack.
Serpentine Belt System
New half shafts and Heavier Duty Ball joints
Radial Tire and Wheel Assembly
Low Profile Run-flat Assembly
Upper Control Arm Assembly (with encapsulated ball joint mounting)
242 Transfer Case
Metal Grille
Flexible Brake Lines at the Calipers
Improved Corrosion Resistance
Improved Engine Starting System
Dual Voltage 200 Amp Alternator for Ambulance
7 HMMWV Remanufacture Program System Specification (Draft), 12 Sep 97.





Scope : This alternative procures HMMWVs which are improved versions of the current series
of A2 model vehicles. Modernized HMMWVs will be produced to meet Army XXI goals in the
following areas:
'6
• Lower overall cost of ownership
• Be affordable to users
• Support Army requirements for information dominance on the modern battlefield
• Leverage and integrate automotive technologies as they mature in the near term
• Support high operational tempos and agility without any increase in O&S costs.
This alternative supports the PM-LTV Life Cycle Management strategy to modernize the
HMMWV fleet by leveraging existing commercial technology being developed in the
Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) program, and developing other improvements
to the current HMMWV to improve its utility to the user. Every seven years there will be a
planned development period culminating in a series of improvements incorporated into
production. These improvements will be block improvement programs to produce a more
capable HMMWV. The first set of improvements are described below and will not be a major
redesign of the vehicle. Future improvements will be determined based on available technology
and the needs of the user community.
General Description : The improved HMMWV will have the model designation "AX" to
distinguish it from earlier series. This designation applies only to the AOA and does not affect
any HMMWV model designations which are part of the LTV LCM acquisition strategy. The
alternative will be represented by the Ml 097AX for capabilities and technology upgrades. The
Ml 097AX will have all the capabilities of the M1097A2 and satisfy additional requirements of
the HMMWV II ORD without significantly redesigning the vehicle. See the attached Vehicle
Comparison Matrix for ratings of this alternative against the ORD requirements.
Vehicle Requirements :
Following are HMMWV ORD capabilities which the Ml 097AX could achieve in the
first cycle of improvements and which are improvements to the M1097A2. Meeting these
capabilities would not require a major redesign of the vehicle envelope:
48 inch water fording
Traction control









Electrical power in cargo compartment
200 amp electrical capacity
Power Take Off capability
Fuel access connection
Night vision device compatibility







Scope : This alternative procures commercial vehicles to meet light tactical vehicle requirements.
As the existing HMMWV fleet reaches the end of its economic useful life, vehicles are replaced
by commercial design vehicles. HMMWVs now in the utility, shelter carrier, ambulance, and
heavy howitzer towing roles will be replaced by commercial trucks manufactured by a US
domestic automobile manufacturer. HMMWVs now in the armament carrier role will be
replaced by the RG-31 Nyala, offered by Diesel Division, General Motors of Canada, Limited
(DDGM).
General Description : The commercial truck will be represented as a generic domestically
manufactured pickup truck with technical upgrades based on planning by the TACOM National
Automotive Center for its COMBATT program. The RG-31 description will be based on
commercial literature descriptions and technical data provided by DDGM. See the attached
Vehicle Comparison Matrix for ratings of this alternative against the ORD requirements.
Vehicle Requirements :
Commercial Truck:
This description covers a family of diesel engine driven, 4 wheel drive light commercial
trucks including versions for utility, cargo, ambulance, and shelter carrier. The basic vehicles
produced will be produced on the same production lines as those offered to the general public.
Military peculiar requirements and performance enhancements will be added to the vehicle by
outside "upfitters." All commercial truck types are expected to have a service life of seven years
and shall be capable of providing tactical standard mobility required for infrequent off road
operations over selected terrain with the preponderance of operations on primary and secondary
roads
9
. Following is a summary of the pickup truck configuration: 1
General
GVW Rating 9,200 lb.
Payload Kits and Crew 3,270 lb.
Wheelbase 131.5 in.
Cargo Box 97.6 in. x 61.9 in.
Regular Equipment
Engine 6.5L (395 CID) turbo diesel 195 bhp @
3400 RPM
Transmission Heavy duty automatic 4 speed with
overdrive
Transfer Case BW 4401, 2 speed, 2.69 low range
Front Axle 4,250 lb. with center disconnect
Front Stabilizer Bar 1.18 in. diameter
9 Based on TACOM Purchase Description for Truck; Utility, Cargo and Ambulance, Diesel Engine Driven, 4X4, 17
May 82.
10




Front Suspension Heavy duty independent torsion bar,
4,250-lb.
'
Rear Axle Full floating, 6,084 lb.
Rear Differential Automatic locking
Rear Suspension Semi-elliptical, 2 stage, 6,084 lb. capacity
Axle Ratio 4.10:1
Shock Absorbers Bilstein heavy duty gas filled
Brakes 4 wheel, antilock, disc front, drum rear
Skid Plates Under front differential, engine and transfer
case
Batteries Dual 1 2 volt @ 600 cold cranking amps
each
Generator Delco-Remy, 12 volt, 100 amp
Air Conditioning Integral with heater/defroster
Cab Regular. 2 door, 3 passenger
Seat Full width bench with folding back
Interior Trim Vinyl seat covers in gray color
Exterior Color 3 color camouflage
Fuel Tank 34 gal. Capacity
Tires 5 LT245/75R16E SBR On/Off Road
Wheels 5 steel disc 16x6.
Rear Window Sliding, center section
Military Equipment
Blackout Lighting Driving, front and rear marker lamps
Brush Guard Radiator grille
Cargo Cover Tarpaulin and bows
Cargo Tiedown 4 Rings on each side of cargo bed
Electrical System 12 volt with 24 volt power converter
Slave Start NATO 24 volt
Tiedown Shackles Front and rear with rear step bumper
Trailer Tow Hook Pintle for 3,000 lb. trailer
Trailer Lighting NATO 12 pin receptacle
Troop Seats 8 Passenger, folding
Weapon Supports For 2 Ml 6 rifles inside cab
Pioneer Kit Compact tool kit
Winch Front mounted 10,000 lb. capacity, electric
RG-31 Nyala:
Diesel Division General Motors of Canada Limited (DDGM) offered the RG-31 Nyala in
response to a November 1996 TACOM market survey of manufacturers of light tactical vehicles.
DDGM intends to develop a North American version of the RG-3 1 and is initially offering it to
law enforcement markets. The US Army purchased five vehicles for mine blast testing and use
in South West Asia.
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The RG-31 is available in two landmine-protected versions: a fully enclosed personnel
carrier, and as a multipurpose utility platform which has an open rear cargo or weapons platform
area. The vehicle was designed specifically for the military and police markets to protect its
occupants against a double TM57 level mine explosion under any wheel, a single detonation
centrally under the vehicle, and small arms fire up to 5.56 x 45mm armor piercing bullets.
Optional protection is available against small arms fire up to 7.62 x 31mm armor piercing
bullets. The armor protection is integral to the vehicle structure and is not a kit. The following
general descriptions describe the fully enclosed personnel carrier:
Crew 1 Driver plus 10 passengers






Ground Clearance 15.75 in.
Wheel Base 133.9 in.
Maximum Road Speed 63 mph
Maximum Longitudinal Slope 60% (Low Range)
Engine Mercedes Benz OM 366A 6 cylinder in line
water cooled turbocharged diesel w/ direct
injection, 168 HP @ 2,800 RPM
Transmission Allison AT-545 4 Speed Automatic
Suspension Semi-elliptical leaf springs and hydraulic
telescopic double-acting telescopic shock
absorbers
Steering Full power
Turning Radius 26.25 ft.
Brakes Main: pneumatic. Parking: pneumatic
release/spring applied
Tires 12.5x20 radial, 16 ply





Scope : This alternative conducts a hybrid remanufacturing program to extend the economic
useful life of the HMMWV fleet by approximately 50% while simultaneously reducing O&S
costs. This alternative is part of the Recapitalization pillar of the PM-LTV Life Cyle
Management strategy of using available funds to preserve and enhance past investments. It
affords an excellent opportunity for both Modernization Through Spares (MTS) and Horizontal
Technology Insertion (HTI).
General Description : For the AOA, these vehicles will have the "A4" model designation. The
hybrid remanufacturing program is so titled in order to distinguish it from a complete
remanufacture. One of its goals is to return selected high cost drivers to year one O&S costs.
The hybrid remanufacturing process will incorporate the following:
Integrate applique hardware for Army XXI digitization efforts.
Upgrade power capability (minimum of 100 amp alternator).
Convert selected existing vehicles to correct imbalances in the fleet model mix.
Check and apply applicable HMMWV Fleet modification work orders and directed
upgrades.
Inspect and repair body and structure problems.
Rebuild drive train (engines and transmissions).
Install new vehicle control unit.
The hybrid remanufacturing program will have a cost ceiling of 50% of the acquisition
cost of a new vehicle. Odometers on HMMWV s inducted into this program will not be
reset to zero. Selection of vehicles for induction will be based upon a combination of
age, mileage, and overall vehicle condition. See the attached Vehicle Comparison Matrix
for ratings of this alternative against the ORD requirements.
Vehicle Requirements : Vehicles remanufactured in this alternative will perform at a level not
less than that of a M998 HMMWV half-way through its Economic Useful Life and at
significantly reduced O&S costs. This alternative extends the Economic Useful Life of inducted
HMMWV's by six years with a resultant reduction in maintenance costs of 41%. This is




PROCURE A COMBINATION OF ALTERNATIVES (BASELINE, 2A, 3)
Scope : This alternative procures vehicles through a combination of alternatives. It consists of
Alternative 2A, Improved HMMWV (to modernize portions of the fleet); Alternative 3, Hybrid
Remanufacturing (to recapitalize the oldest vehicles and preserve investments already made);
and continued procurement of new baseline A2 series HMMWVs to fill shortages and maintain a
warm production base. This alternative does not involve any vehicle that is not already
described in an earlier alternative or in the baseline.
General Description : This alternative, as an Army strategy, has the following objectives and
limitations:
Objectives
• Recapitalize on our initial investment in the aging fleet
• Maintain the current fleet through 2010
• Modernize the fleet to focus on Army and Joint Vision goals
Assumptions:
• No "leap ahead" technologies now or in near term render the HMMWV obsolete
• The HMMWV is the basic light tactical vehicle for Army XXI
• No new start or follow-on developmental system is needed until Army After Next
• A stable funding stream is maintained




PROCURE A COMBINATION OF ALTERNATIVES (BASELINE, 1, 2A)
Scope : This alternative procures vehicles through a combination of alternatives This alternative
represents the PM-LTV Life Cycle Management strategy, which consists of Alternative 1,
Extended Service Program (to recapitalize the oldest vehicles and preserve investments already
made); Alternative 2A, Improved HMMWV (to modernize portions of the fleet), and continued
procurement of new baseline A2 series HMMWVs to fill shortages and maintain a warm
production base. The Extended Service Program portion of this alternative will include a range
of recapitalization activities depending on the condition of individual HMMWVs inducted into
the program. This alternative does not involve any vehicle that is not already described in an
earlier alternative or in the baseline.
General Description : This alternative, as an Army strategy, has the following objectives and
limitations:
Objectives
• Recapitalize on our initial investment in the aging fleet
• Maintain the current fleet through 2010
• Modernize the fleet to focus on Army and Joint Vision goals
Assumptions:
• No "leap ahead" technologies now or in near term render the HMMWV obsolete
• The HMMWV is the basic light tactical vehicle for Army XXI
• No new start or follow-on developmental system is needed until Army After Next
• A stable funding stream is maintained




PROCURE AN EXISTING ARMY VEHICLE
Scope : This alternative procures vehicles which are already in the Army fleet for other roles and
uses them to fill some light tactical vehicle roles now filled by the HMMWV. As the HMMWV
fleet ages, vehicles in the shelter carrier roles would be replaced by the Ml 078 Light Medium
Tactical Vehicle (LMTV). HMMWVs in the armament carrier role would be replaced by the
XM1 1 17 Armored Security Vehicle (ASV).
General Description : The LMTV is the light version of the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
(FMTV) which consists of light and medium vehicles, including trailers. It covers a family of
diesel engine driven, automatic shift transmission, radial tired, all wheel drive trucks. The
XM1 1 17 ASV is a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) acquisition program. It is a turreted, lightly
armored all wheel drive vehicle that provides ballistic protection to the crew compartment,
weapons station and ammunition storage area; overhead protection; and protection against anti-
personnel mines and anti-tank mines. See the attached Vehicle Comparison Matrix for ratings of
this alternative against the ORD requirements.
Vehicle Requirements:
M1078 LMTV:
The LMTV accommodates a 5,000 lb. payload and a 7,500 lb. towed load. The Medium
tactical Vehicle (MTV) transports a 10,000 lb. payload and a 21,000 lb. towed load. These
vehicles operate under on road/off road conditions and withstand the strain, shocks, vibrations
and other detrimental conditions incident to off road travel and operation. The LMTV carries a
three soldier crew".
XM1117ASV:
The ASV will be transportable (roll-on/roll-off) by C-130 and larger aircraft, rail and
marine transport modes. The ASV will carry 4 persons equipped with a turreted primary
weapons station which includes a day/night target acquisition and fire control system for US
Army Military Police Corps. The ASV will utilize weapons such as the MK19 Grenade Machine
Gun; M-2 .50 caliber machine gun; M-60 7.62mm machine gun; and M249 5.56mm Squad
Automatic Weapon. The ASV, with all kits installed, will accommodate a payload of 3,360 lb.
The ASV will operate on standard Army diesel fuels and JP8; be capable of being towed,
performing self-recovery, recovering equivalent vehicles, and mounting a tow pintle rated at 500
lbs. It will accept current tactical radio systems with appropriate encryption equipment. These
vehicles will operate under on-road/off-road conditions and withstand the strain, shocks,
vibrations and other detrimental conditions incident to off-road travel and operation 1 ".
" FMTV System Specification. 17 Dec 96.
" ASV Draft System Specification.
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